Virginia Commonwealth University

VCU Scholars Compass
Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

2021

The Just Host: Addressing the wage structure problem in the
tourism industry
Bill Farley

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd
Part of the Urban Studies and Planning Commons
© The Author

Downloaded from
https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/6609

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars
Compass. For more information, please contact libcompass@vcu.edu.

The Just Host: Addressing the wage structure problem in the tourism
industry

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.

by:
Bill Farley
M.P.A., University of Southern California
B.S., Oregon State University

Chair: Dr. Elsie Harper-Anderson, Associate Professor
L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs

Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, Virginia

March 4, 2021

The Just Host
Acknowledgements

This dissertation is built on research I conducted in several classes during my time at the L.
Douglas Wilder School. That research was supported by several faculty members who gave me
the tools and strategies to produce this final product. Helping me tie it all together were the
committee members listed below. I am especially grateful to this group for their patience,
understanding and encouragement as I endeavored to complete other elements of the Ph.D.
program. I also acknowledge the important role of the support staff at the L. Douglas Wilder
School and the Cabell Library in making my journey through the Ph.D. program a success.

Committee Members
L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs
Dr. Elsie Harper Anderson, Associate Professor (Chair)
Dr. I-Shian Suen, Associate Professor
Dr. Benjamin Teresa, Assistant Professor
College of Humanities and Sciences, Sociology Department
Dr. Victor Chen, Assistant Professor

2

The Just Host
Abstract
Since the early 1990’s, tourism development has been promoted to replace employment
lost to downsizing, outsourcing and automation in both urban and rural America. These efforts
are actively supported by state and local chambers of commerce. However, despite the
enthusiasm for tourism within city halls and business membership organizations, planning
theorists have expressed concerns about the wage structure of the industry. Specifically, given
the significant public investment in the industry, planners are being asked by some theorists to
consider the distribution of economic benefits between labor and capital. This dissertation
explores this issue and concludes with a study focused on the origins and distribution of public
economic benefits – areas that have received little attention to date. Using Power to Tax theory
as a theoretical framework a strong relationship was established between hotel revenue per capita
(a proxy for hotel taxes) and local government wages per capita. The study found no association
between natural amenities and local government wages per capita, independent of the path
through hotel revenue per capita. These findings suggest local government officials are enriching
themselves by commodifying their commons (natural amenities) through the low-wage tourism
industry. Recommendations are made to Fainstein’s Just City planning model to advance a more
equitable distribution of public economic benefits derived from natural amenities and the local
residents toiling in the tourism industry.

3

The Just Host
Table of Contents
Contents
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 3
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ 4
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. 7
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. 8
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 9
Significance of the Research Topic ........................................................................................... 11
Distribution Theories Considered ............................................................................................. 12
Research Design & Methodology ............................................................................................. 16
Chapter 2: Background & Literature Review ............................................................................... 18
How do you measure the distribution of economic benefits from tourism? ............................. 21
Example: Prospective Business Class Hotel ......................................................................... 21
Measuring Economic Benefits with Input-Output Models.................................................... 23
Measuring Economic Benefits through Community Benefit Assessments ........................... 25
Measuring Economic Benefits from a Sustainability Perspective......................................... 27
What forces change the distribution of private economic benefits to improve wages? ............ 30
How are public economic benefits distributed? ........................................................................ 35
How do natural amenities influence tourism development and taxation? ................................ 36
Research Questions from the Literature Review....................................................................... 38
Theoretical Frameworks to Predict Direction of Associations .............................................. 39
Chapter 3: Research Design, Methods & Data Preparation .......................................................... 44
Research Hypotheses (H1 – H7) ................................................................................................. 45
Operational Definitions and Data Sets for Variables of Interest ............................................... 50
Data Analysis Techniques ......................................................................................................... 57
Validity, Reliability and Limitations ......................................................................................... 57
Assessment of Findings ............................................................................................................. 59
Data Preparation: H1 through H5 ............................................................................................... 60
1.

Data Acquisition and Univariate Screening ................................................................... 60

2.

Bivariate Screening of County-based Variables ............................................................ 64

3.

Multivariate Screening for County-based Variables ...................................................... 65

4.

Summary of Missing Data & Limitations ...................................................................... 66
4

The Just Host
Data Preparation: H6.................................................................................................................. 66
1.

Data Acquisition and Univariate Screening ................................................................... 66

2.

Bivariate Screening of MSA-based Variables ............................................................... 68

3.

Multivariate Screening ................................................................................................... 69

4.

Summary of Missing Data & Limitations ...................................................................... 69

Data Preparation: H7.................................................................................................................. 69
1.

Data Acquisition and Univariate Screening ................................................................... 69

2.

Bivariate Screening ........................................................................................................ 71

3.

Multivariate Screening ................................................................................................... 72

4.

Summary of Missing Data & Limitations ...................................................................... 72

Chapter 4: Statistical Analysis and Findings ................................................................................ 73
Overview of Findings ................................................................................................................ 73
H1: Counties with higher levels of per capita hotel revenue will have higher levels of per capita
local government wages ............................................................................................................ 74
H2: Counties with higher scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will have higher per
capita hotel revenue ................................................................................................................... 76
H3: Counties with higher scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will have higher levels
of per capita local government wages ....................................................................................... 77
H4: County scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will not influence per capita local
government wages independent of its effect on hotel revenue per capita ................................. 79
H5: There will be a stronger positive relationship between per capita hotel revenue and per
capita local government wages in Mostly Rural and Rural counties as compared to Mostly
Urban counties........................................................................................................................... 82
H6: MSA’s with higher levels of union membership will have higher levels of accommodation
subsector wages ......................................................................................................................... 83
H7: Counties with a higher differential in racial composition between housekeeping
supervisors and housekeeping employees will have lower housekeeping wages ..................... 85
Chapter 5: Discussion ................................................................................................................... 87
Conclusions and Recommendations.......................................................................................... 91
1.

Focus on the distribution of public economic benefits .................................................. 93

2.

Consider the past and present influence of rational actors ............................................. 94

3.

Promote Integrated Planning .......................................................................................... 95

4.

New strategic considerations and measures for Fainstein’s Just City Model ................ 97

Future Research ......................................................................................................................... 98
5

The Just Host
1.

Other tourism subsectors ................................................................................................ 98

2.

Evaluate Split Labor Markets within and across multiple industries ............................. 99

3.

Review impact of wage ordinances on tourism economics ........................................... 99

4.

Covid 19 and tourism resiliency................................................................................... 100

Appendix A: Living Wage Data from Prospective Business Class Hotel Model....................... 101
Appendix B: Data Cleaning Steps .............................................................................................. 102
Appendix C: Graphs and Tables used in Data Cleaning............................................................. 105
Local Government Wages per Capita ..................................................................................... 105
Hotel Revenue Per Capita ....................................................................................................... 106
Natural Amenities ................................................................................................................... 108
Median Gross Rent (H1-H5) .................................................................................................... 109
Bivariate Screening (H1-H5) .................................................................................................... 110
Hotel Clerk Wages (H6) .......................................................................................................... 113
Union Membership (H6) .......................................................................................................... 114
Median Gross Rent (H6) .......................................................................................................... 115
Bivariate Screening (H6) ......................................................................................................... 116
Housekeeping Wages (H7) ...................................................................................................... 117
Supervisor-Employee Racial Composition Gap (H7).............................................................. 118
Median Gross Rent (H7) .......................................................................................................... 119
Bivariate Screening (H7) ......................................................................................................... 120
Appendix D: PROCESS Output for Mediation Model ............................................................... 122
Appendix E: Transformation of Results ..................................................................................... 125
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 126
Curriculum Vitae ........................................................................................................................ 134

6

The Just Host
List of Tables
Table 1: Distribution Theories ...................................................................................................... 14
Table 2: Composition of the United States Tourism Industry, 2018 ............................................ 19
Table 3: Summary of Revenues and Expenditures for a Proposed Business Class Hotel ............ 22
Table 4: Local and Non-Local Economic Beneficiaries ............................................................... 26
Table 5: Economic Sustainability Measures ................................................................................. 29
Table 6: Median Wages for Accommodation and Food Sector .................................................... 32
Table 7: Projected Tax Revenues from a Proposed Business Class Hotel ................................... 36
Table 8: Research Questions, Sourcing and Theoretical Frameworks ......................................... 39
Table 9: Distribution of Housekeeping Occupation Classifications by Industry ......................... 42
Table 10: Overview of Research Questions and Hypotheses ....................................................... 45
Table 11: Data Sources for Variables ........................................................................................... 56
Table 12: Overview of Findings ................................................................................................... 74
Table 13: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita)
predicting Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) (N=2,761) .............................................. 75
Table 14: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Natural Amenities predicting Log
(Local Government Wages) (N = 2,828) ...................................................................................... 78
Table 15 Results of Simple Mediation Model for H4 (N=2,712) .................................................. 80
Table 16: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) and Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) by
Rural Classification ....................................................................................................................... 83
Table 17: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Private Union Membership Predicting
Hotel Desk Clerk Wages ............................................................................................................... 84
Table 18: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Racial Disparity between Supervisors
and Employees predicting Minority Wages .................................................................................. 85
Table A- 1: Wage Schedule for Business Class Hotel Model .................................................... 101
Table C- 1: Transformation Options for Local Government Wages Per Capita Data ................ 105
Table C- 2: Correlation among Hotel Data ................................................................................. 106
Table C- 3: Hotel Revenue Per Capita Data after Transformation ............................................. 107
Table C- 4: Transformation of Median Gross Rent .................................................................... 109
Table C- 5: Outliers Removed .................................................................................................... 112
Table C- 6: Transformation of Mean Housekeeping Wages ...................................................... 117
Table C- 7: Median Gross Rent and Log (Median Gross Rent) ................................................. 119

7

The Just Host
List of Figures
Figure 1: Continuum of Distribution Theories and Concepts ....................................................... 15
Figure 2: Conceptual Diagram of Statistical Test for Hypotheses #1 - #4 ................................... 48
Figure 3: Conceptual Diagram of Statistical Test (with split file) for Hypothesis #5 .................. 49
Figure 4: Conceptual Diagram of Statistical Test for Hypothesis #6 ........................................... 49
Figure 5: Conceptual Diagram of Statistical Test for Hypothesis #7 ........................................... 50
Figure 6: Simple Mediation Model Results for H4 ....................................................................... 80
Figure 7: New Contributions ........................................................................................................ 88
Figure 8: Fainstein's Just City Planning Model & Recommended Additions (italics/bold) ......... 97
Figure C- 1: Distribution of Data prior to Transformation ......................................................... 105
Figure C- 2: Distribution of Data for Local Government Wages after Transformation ............. 106
Figure C- 3: Distribution of Hotel Revenue Per Capita Data ..................................................... 107
Figure C- 4: Common Log of Hotel Revenue Per Capita ........................................................... 108
Figure C- 5: Distribution of Natural Amenities Scale ................................................................ 108
Figure C- 6: Distribution of Median Gross Rent ........................................................................ 109
Figure C- 7: Transformation of Median Gross Rent ................................................................... 110
Figure C- 8: Bivariate Screening of Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) and Log (Hotel
Revenue Per Capita) ................................................................................................................... 110
Figure C- 9: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) and Natural Amenities ..................... 111
Figure C- 10: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) and Natural Amenities ..................................... 111
Figure C- 11: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) and Log (Median Gross Rent) ....... 112
Figure C- 12: Hotel Clerk Mean Hourly Wage .......................................................................... 113
Figure C- 13: Log (Mean Hourly Hotel Clerk Wages) ............................................................... 113
Figure C- 14: Private Union Membership Percentage ................................................................ 114
Figure C- 15: Log (Private Union Membership Percentage) ...................................................... 114
Figure C- 16: Median Gross Rent ............................................................................................... 115
Figure C- 17: Log (Median Gross Rent) ..................................................................................... 115
Figure C- 18: Log (Mean Hotel Clerk Hourly Wage) & Log (Private Union Membership
Percentage) .................................................................................................................................. 116
Figure C- 19: Log (Mean Hotel Clerk Hourly Wages) & Log (Median Gross Rent) ................ 116
Figure C- 20: Mean Housekeeping Hourly Wages ..................................................................... 117
Figure C- 21: Log (Mean Housekeeping Hourly Wages) ........................................................... 118
Figure C- 22: Racial Gap between Housekeeping Supervisors and Housekeepers .................... 118
Figure C- 23: Median Gross Rent 2010 ...................................................................................... 119
Figure C- 24: Log (Median Gross Rent) ..................................................................................... 120
Figure C- 25: Log (Housekeeping Wages) and Race Gap .......................................................... 120
Figure C- 26: Log (Mean Hourly Housekeeping Wage) and Log (Median Gross Rent) ........... 121
Figure C- 27: Residual Plot for Hypothesis 7 ............................................................................. 121

8

The Just Host

Chapter 1: Introduction
Interest in tourism grew in the early 1990s as cities and rural communities struggled to
retain traditional employers. Today, public officials across the United States and their economic
advisers champion the cause of tourism by using economic models to show how tourist spending
gets converted, among other things, to restaurant tabs and then to employee wages. In turn, these
employee wages are used to buy consumables that bolster the economy. This logic has inspired
public-private partnerships to develop hotels, attract visitors and build comfortable meeting
spaces and entertainment venues for their enjoyment. Cities battle vigorously among each other,
competing in bidding wars to host conventions, sporting events and various forms of
entertainment to attract visitors to their community. However, the enthusiasm for chasing tourist
dollars within town halls and chambers of commerce is not without detractors. Urban theorists
and rural economists have raised concerns about the negative consequences of competitive
planning, the distribution of economic benefits from tourism and, specifically, how this
distribution impacts the wage structure within the industry (Fainstein, 2010; Harvey, 2012;
Marcouiller et al., 2004).
At the onset of the tourism revival, the burden for addressing the wage structure in the
tourism industry was left to labor organizations and community organizers (Judd & Fainstein,
1999). Susan Fainstein revisited the topic in The Just City (2010). Based on two decades of
public investment in tourism-related subsectors, and without any measurable progress increasing
the wage structure of front-line employees, Fainstein argues for regulating private investment in
the industry and “injecting concerns of justice into policy making” (Fainstein, 2010, pp. 179–
183). David Harvey expressed similar sentiments in Rebel Cities (2012) after observing an array
9
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of private profiteers trading on tourist attractions built and maintained with public investment.
Harvey considers these profit-taking practices an appropriation of capital that belongs to the
community: “why let the monopoly rent attached to that symbolic capital [tourist attractions] be
captured only by the multinationals, or by a small, powerful segment of the bourgeoisie?”
(Harvey, 2012, pp. 105–106). To address the issue, Fainstein argues that public officials should
provide accurate information on the distribution of private economic benefits within the tourism
industry so the debate in City Halls can shift from promoting tourism development to concerns
of equity (Fainstein, 2010).
Notably missing from Fainstein’s and Harvey’s arguments, however, is consideration of
the distribution of public economic benefits of tourism (i.e., tax revenue). There are good reasons
to suspect public economic benefits of tourism accruing to state and local governments are
material and should be a significant part of any redistribution debate. A 2014 survey on local
economic development conducted by the International City Managers Association (ICMA) found
that among five potential priorities (tax base, jobs, quality of life, environmental sustainability,
and social equity) city officials ranked increasing the local tax base first and addressing social
equity last. Of the 32 activities identified to address their priorities, tourism promotion was
ranked second, only behind quality of life investments like arts, culture, education and recreation
(Economic Development 2014 Survey Results, 2014). The proximity of increasing revenues (tax
base) as an end, and tourism promotion as a means, indicates local governments are pursing
tourism, at least in part, to generate revenue for city coffers.
Also missing from Fainstein and Harvey’s arguments is consideration of the nonmonetary elements which support tourism. While both refer to public and private investment in
the built environment to spur tourism, neither address nor value the natural amenities of a
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community which attract visitors. This dimension, where the spark for tourism development is
rooted in part to natural amenities, has important implications for the distribution of benefits
derived from what is part of the community commons.

Significance of the Research Topic
This dissertation explores a vexing issue for local governments; their pursuit of tourism
under the banner of local economic development, while front-line workers in the hospitality
subsector are excluded from the economic benefits of the industry. I begin with a review of the
distribution of the primary economic benefits in the hospitality subsector and how secondary
economic benefits are conceptualized and measured in the broader tourism industry. I then turn
to 1) a review of the literature of external and internal forces associated with changes in the wage
structure of various service sectors and 2) a review of the public economic benefits associated
with the hospitality subsector. It is in this last section where I identify significant gaps in the
existing literature - the origins and distribution of public profits from the hospitality subsector.
My primary hypothesis, based on one of several theoretical frameworks which can be
applied to this problem, is that public officials are using tax revenue from tourism for selfenrichment. Building on previous research, I also hypothesize that there is a causal pathway from
natural amenities to local government wages through the tax revenue generated from tourism.
The findings from this study will make a significant contribution to the discourse on the wage
structure problem in the tourism industry. If the findings indicate public officials are using
tourism tax revenue for self-enrichment, and that natural amenities are the origins of this
revenue, it will open a new avenue for discussions on the redistribution of economic benefits and
the utility of commons planning advocated by Peter Marcuse (Marcuse, 2009). If the findings do
11
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not support the hypotheses, it will challenge previous research by public choice economists, and
focus the wage debate, as Fainstein and Harvey suggested, on the redistribution of private
economic benefits to address the wage structure issues in the industry.
Distribution Theories Considered
Economists have put forward several hypotheses, theories, and concepts to predict how
profits are, or should be, distributed in the tourism industry– five of which I detail below. The
first two are offered by two pairs of public choice economists: Richard Musgrave and Peggy
Musgrave, and Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchannan. These economists view economic
policy from a presumption that bureaucrats and politicians are rational actors and enter
government service to pursue their own self-interests (Black et al., 2012).
Musgrave and Musgrave frame their theory of public expenditures as a “Leviathan
Hypothesis” based on the classic work of Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes, 1996, p. xx). They suggest
that, while bureaucrats are motivated by rational self-interests to divert excess tax revenue to
larger staff and increased salaries, their efforts are counterbalanced by politicians driven to
increase services desired by a majority of the electorate. In this tug-of war between rational
interests, the outcome is increased public services (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989). Under this
hypothesis, local governments would be expected to use excess tax revenue from tourism to
boost local expenditures that serve the public interest.
The Power to Tax theory, developed by Geoffrey Brennan and Nobel laureate James
Buchanan, challenge the Leviathan Hypothesis. Their theory casts public officials as egoistic
despots, intent on increasing their own compensation and numbers with the taxes they collect,
and capable of deflecting the spending priorities of elected officials (Brennan & Buchanan,
12
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2000). So, while both public choice theories expect public officials to seize opportunities to
push taxes upward, they differ in characterizing the use of these tax revenues as either
benevolent or malevolent, respectfully.
The public good concept can also be used to predict the distribution of economic benefits.
Espoused by neo-liberal economists, this concept suggests the most efficient use of tourism tax
revenue is for public expenditures that sustain or develop the tourism sector. These expenditures
could include subsidies for convention facilities and visitor attractions, or marketing and
promotional campaigns to attract visitors. Since private tourism-related businesses do not have a
mechanism to capture secondary and tertiary benefits of visitor spending, and therefore cannot
incorporate those revenues into marketing and development, it is left to the public sector to
capture a portion of this tourism revenue through taxes and invest those proceeds in activities
that support the industry (Britton, 1991; Dwyer et al., 2010).
The final two distributive concepts considered here are normative and centered on the
employee. The first is a proposition from Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations (1776). Smith
argued for wages sufficient for a worker to raise a family on one income. Smith’s rationale was
that families needed to thrive in order to provide capitalists with a future supply of workers
(Smith, 1776). The current Federal minimum wage does not accomplish Smith’s goal, but many
local governments have moved in that direction by imposing living wage requirements (Reich et
al., 2014). The second proposition is offered by Karl Marx. He assumed that workers would earn
a living wage, but argued that this was not sufficient nor just, and that employees should receive
a portion of business revenues. His labor theory calculated the worth of an employee based on
their contribution to company revenues (Marx, 1867). Under Marx’s theory, local governments
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would take steps to ensure not only a family wage but would also require profit sharing for
employees.
Table 1 illustrates how the application of these models would direct the use of excess tax
revenue from tourism.
Table 1: Distribution Theories
Theory/Concept

Proponents

Distribution of Tourism
Taxes
Boost salaries of public
officials

Power to Tax

Brennan and Buchanan

Public Good

Dwyer et al

Tourism promotion and
facilities

Leviathan

Musgrave and Musgrave

Benevolent expenditures for the
good of the public at large

Family Wage

Adam Smith

Employee wages

Labor Theory of Value

Karl Marx

Employee profit sharing

The figure below illustrates how these distributive theories and concepts can be viewed
on a continuum based on outcomes.
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Figure 1: Continuum of Distribution Theories and Concepts

Distribution Theories/Concepts
Power to Tax

Public Good

Leviathan

Adam Smith

Marx

Who Benefits?
Government

Community

Individuals

Outcomes
Government
Employee Salaries

Promotion &
Facilities

Public Amenities

Employee Living
Wages

Employee Profit
Participation

For this study, the Power to Tax theory is selected as the framework to investigate the
distribution of public benefits (i.e., tax revenue) from tourism. There are three reasons for this
selection. First, using a public choice theory to address social equity issues is supported in public
administration literature. H. George Frederickson, the first champion for injecting social equity
into public administration, called for public administrators to address the principles of public
choice theory in their pursuit of social equity (Frederickson, 1991). Second, expenditures on
local government employees (average salaries and total payroll) are measured annually by the
U.S. Government and therefore can be operationalized more accurately than the less well-defined
benevolent expenditures, spending on tourism promotion and marketing, family wages, or
employee profit sharing. And, finally, recent studies by public choice economists have tested the
Power to Tax theory using government employee compensation as an outcome variable
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(Brueckner & Neumark, 2014; Diamond, 2017). This dissertation can build on these recent
public choice studies, using standardized variables to measure government employee
compensation (Gerring, 2012).
Research Design & Methodology
The primary research problems being addressed in this dissertation are 1) identifying the
distribution of public economic benefits from tourism activity and 2) evaluating the role of
natural amenities in generating tourism activity. The Power to Tax theory is used as the
theoretical framework for the distribution of benefits and the general hypothesis is that hotel tax
revenues (independent variable) are being used to boost public employee salaries and overall
payrolls (dependent variable). In addition, several other research questions emanating from the
literature review are addressed. These include whether or not the external forces of unionization
are associated with higher wages in the accommodation (hotel) subsector, and if the differential
in racial composition between supervisors and back of house employees, is an internal force
associated with lower wage levels for back of house hotel employees.
The proposal is to use a non-experimental associational design for each of the research
questions. It is non-experimental because the independent variables cannot be manipulated and
the interaction between variables is only being tested for one group (there is no control group). It
is associational because the specific purpose of this design type is to explore relationships
between variables (Gerring, 2012) This study uses cross-sectional data and is conducted at the
meso-level with the unit of analysis being Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) for one set of
hypotheses (due to a limitation of the data sets) and counties for another set of hypotheses.
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The concepts addressed in the study (i.e., tourism, natural amenities, self-enrichment,
unionization, urban vs. rural, split-labor market, etc.) are operationalized in many cases by using
established measurement scales or drawn from other studies. The partial replication of other
studies and the use of existing measurement scales strengthens the internal and external validity
of the measurements (Gerring, 2012). All variables, except for urbanization, are measured at the
interval or ratio level, permitting more precise measurement and more options for advanced
statistical techniques (Gerring, 2012). Urbanization is measured categorically due to the highly
skewed nature of the data. The variables used in these hypotheses are fully described in Chapter
3.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized in four chapters; Chapter 2 provides detailed
background on the topic and a literature review, Chapter 3 outlines the research design and
methods, Chapter 4 provides the findings, and Chapter 5 provides the conclusions. These
chapters are followed by an appendix, bibliography, and my current Curriculum Vitae.
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Chapter 2: Background & Literature Review
Urban and rural interest in tourism, from a local economic development perspective, gained
traction in the early 1990s as town and country struggled to retain traditional employers. Cities
worked diligently to renovate and convert spaces, once dedicated to production, and often in a
state of decline, to areas which could support consumption by visitors (Judd & Fainstein, 1999).
Upon completion of these new spaces, cities marketed them as commodities in hopes of drawing
visitors, creating jobs, and producing new tax revenue (Fainstein & Gladstone, 1999). Rural
communities, instead of rebuilding town centers to create amenities for visitors, focused on
commodifying natural amenities (Halseth et al., 2010; Hassebrook, 2003) or leveraging interest
in tours of agri-business (e.g., wineries, farms and dairies) (Britton, 1991).
Planning theorists noted at the time of the resurgence in tourism that there were several
issues with the sector that should be addressed by public officials with new regulations.
Destinations needed protection from environmental impacts, unwanted commercialization, and
in some cases increased crime associated with visitors. Conversely, cities need to construct
safeguards to protect visitors – which is a critical component for protecting the reputation of the
destination. These safeguards, in turn, can contribute to additional issues such as gentrification
and spatial segregation (Hoffman et al., 2003). The burden for addressing issues of justice,
however, such as low wages was left explicitly to labor organizations and community organizers
(Judd & Fainstein, 1999).
Twenty years removed from this call for regulatory controls, and with no substantial changes
in the wages structure of the industry, Fainstein revisited the topic in The Just City (2010). Based
on the significant public investment in tourism over the prior two decades, she heightened her
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call for regulating private investment in the industry through “injecting concerns of justice into
policy making.” A critical part of this charge was for local planners to study the distribution of
private economic benefits within the tourism industry (Fainstein, 2010, pp. 179–183).
The task of identifying the private distribution of economic benefits in the tourism industry is
complex. The tourism industry is comprised of several sectors and subsectors classified under
the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). For most of these subsectors,
spending of residents and travelers must be divided to isolate tourism related activity. The U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis performs this split at the National and State levels using guidelines
promulgated by the United Nations. Table 2 provides this calculation of employment and
spending activity for each of the subsectors associated with the tourism industry in the United
States (Franks & Osborne, 2019).
Table 2: Composition of the United States Tourism Industry, 2018
Subsectors

Employment (000’s)

Visitor Spending (000’s)

Hospitality (Hotels)
1,538
26.0%
$191,786
18.1%
Restaurants
1,665
28.1%
$122,105
11.5%
Air Transportation
582
9.82%
$215,167
20.27%
Car Rental
104
1.76%
$36,634
3.45%
Travel Reservations
199
3.36%
$49,843
4.70%
Gasoline Stations
189
3.19%
$159,449
15.02%
Other
326
5.25%
$50,721
4.78%
Transportation
Services
Recreation
575
9.7%
$97,523
9.2%
Shopping
505
8.5%
$135,087
12.7%
Other
242
4.1%
$2,956
0.3%
Total
5,925
100%
$1,061,271
100%
Source: Survey of Current Business, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (Franks & Osborne, 2019)

The quantitative and qualitative research on tourism include several ways to measure the
economic benefits of tourism for business owners, local communities, government agencies,
family units, and individuals. Some of these measures can be applied across the spectrum of
19
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subsectors which comprise the tourism industry (e.g., hospitality, restaurants, transportation,
recreation, and shopping). However, to create a manageable scope for this dissertation, I limit the
focus of much of the literature review to the accommodation subsector. The accommodation, or
hospitality subsector is an appropriate segment on which to focus as hotels are the cornerstone of
tourism industry, serving as the temporary residence for visitors – their home base for sightseeing excursions, shopping trips, dining out and attending shows and sporting events. Hotels, as
opposed to Airbnb rentals, restaurants, museums, and other businesses which support tourism,
are used exclusively by visitors and comprise one of the largest components of local spending by
tourists (Guttentag, 2015; Measuring Employment in the Tourism Industries: Guide with Best
Practices, 2014).
The literature review which follows is divided into five sections. The first section reviews
literature on the distribution of private economic benefits in the accommodation subsector. The
second section reviews literature specific to the wage structure of service sectors which comprise
the tourism industry - and the external and internal forces associated with changes in wages. The
third section reviews the distribution of the primary public economic benefit from hotel
properties – transient occupancy taxes. It is in this section where a gap in the literature is
identified, and one of the primary research questions is developed. The fourth section reviews the
literature on the relationship between natural amenities and tourism. It is in this section where the
other primary research question is developed. The final section presents all the research
questions to be studied, and the theoretical frameworks used to establish the direction of
associations for the hypotheses. The chapter concludes with a set of hypotheses to carry forward
into Chapter 3 (research design and methodology).
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How do you measure the distribution of economic benefits from tourism?
Fainstein argues that understanding the distribution of economic benefits within the
tourism industry is important for planners to inject matters of social equity into policymaking
(Fainstein, 2010). A rich source of information on the distribution of private economic benefits
generated by hotels is the economic feasibility studies sponsored by local governments. These
studies contain microsimulation models of hotel operations and are commissioned by local
governments to study and promote the feasibility of constructing new hotels in their jurisdictions.
The studies project the detailed revenues, expenditures, and net income of prospective hotels. In
these line items, the distribution of private economic benefits is on full display. In some studies,
the consulting analyst goes further and projects the wage structure within the prospective hotel
and the local taxes that would be paid by hotel guests. Microsimulation models are gaining
popularity in policy analysis (Figari et al., 2014), and these studies on individual hotels can serve
as a basis to build models for planners to extrapolate to, and assess the distribution of economic
benefits for, the entire hospitality subsector in their community.
Example: Prospective Business Class Hotel
A hotel feasibility study which provides a comprehensive projection of private and public
economic benefits was conducted for a municipality outside Birmingham, Alabama by Interim
Hospitality Consultants (IHC). The study is for a business class hotel (Hampton Inn and Suites
by Hilton) of 70 rooms, approximating the national average of 71 rooms per hotel (Economic
Survey, 2012). Table 3 replicates a summary of projected annual revenues, profit by department,
and expenditures presented in the hotel feasibility study.
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Table 3: Summary of Revenues and Expenditures for a Proposed Business Class Hotel
Revenue
Rooms

$

Telecommunications (Complementary)

$

2,027,393
-0-

Retail Center

$

53,030

Other Revenue

$

35,360

Total Revenue

$

2,115,783

Rooms

$

1,504,348

Telecommunications

$

(30,852)

Retail Center

$

26,444

Other Hotel

$

17,630

Total Dept./House Profit

$

1,517,570

Administrative & General

$

199,014

Sales & Marketing

$

83,999

Department Profit*

Deductions from Income

Complimentary Guest Services

$

99,386

Marketing fee (% of Room Rev)

3.00%

$

60,822

Franchise fee (%of Room Rev)

6.00%

$

121,644

Utilities

$

128,207

Repairs & Maintenance

$

92,348

Total Deductions from Income

$

785,419

Gross Operating Profit
(Department Profits less Deductions from Income)
Management Fee

$

732,151

$

63,640

Real Estate Tax

$

50,000

Insurance

$

25,000

Replacement Reserves

$

21,210

Total Fixed Cost & Management Fee

$

159,850

Net Operating Income

$

572,301

Fixed Costs

* Net revenue after deduction for expenses
Data sources: Interim Hospitality Consultants 2011 (Schedule 1, page H-2)

The purpose of Table 3 is to communicate to prospective investors the feasibility of a
hotel development. Investors validate the accuracy of the individual line items and then focus on
the Net Operating Income (NOI). The NOI is the annual cashflow received by the investor and it
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is used to calculate the prospective value of the hotel. This is the primary private economic
benefit generated by a hotel, and the distribution of this benefit is made solely to investors.
However, there are several other private economic benefits and recipients embedded in each of
the line items listed above the NOI. IHC provides additional schedules in their report which
detail the beneficiaries of these expenditures. These expenses are secondary benefits and are
typically used by economists and public policy makers to support development of hotel
properties. Neo-liberal economists, heterodox economists, sociologists and urban theorists view
this, and other data associated with hotel operations, in different ways. Neo-liberal economists,
in general, favor pairing hotel revenue data with input-output (I/O) models to measure economic
benefits while heterodox economists and others tend to focus on wage data and business-tobusiness expenditures to measure economic sustainability.
Measuring Economic Benefits with Input-Output Models
The input-output models favored by neo-liberal economists are widely used by local
governments to characterize the private economic benefits of tourism investments. These models
are presented as economic impact assessments and focus on measuring consumer spending
activity and how the injection of outside money into a local economy multiplies as spending
flows from the tourist to business, from business to business, from business to employee wages,
and then once again from employees spending their wages in the local service sector for
groceries and other goods (Bess & Ambargis, 2011). These assessments are promoted as useful
tools to inform policy makers on the prioritization of public resources (Dwyer et al., 2010).
Input-output models calculate economic impacts by applying multipliers to economic
inputs to calculate economic outputs. Inputs vary across sectors, but for the tourism industry,
visitor spending is typically used as the input. This includes visitor spending on hotels,
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transportation, meals, entertainment and shopping. The multiplier used to calculate outputs
(indirect and induced spending) is ideally customized based on local wages, availability of
tourism-related business to purchase goods locally (indirect impacts), and the opportunities for
tourism employees to spend their earnings locally (induced impacts).
Input-out models can produce striking numbers and are routinely used to justify public
investment in tourism. However, there are critics, even among neo-liberal economists, of inputoutput models. One of the primary criticisms is the limitations of the models to accurately
capture benefits within a specified geographic boundary (State, region, city). Predicting where
businesses and employees will spend income received from tourist activity requires detailed
research specific to the subject location. Yet virtually all input-output models rely on generic
composite multipliers. Another criticism is the inability of input-output models to capture the full
range of costs and benefits associated with an infusion of tourist spending into a community. On
the cost side, this includes the inability of the model to capture the costs to the public associated
with adding low-wage employees into the local economy. On the benefit side, the model does
not estimate the tax revenue brought into a community by tourists, compared to the cost to
provide those visitors public services. Because of the significance of these and other limitations,
some economists believe the input-output models are ineffective for measuring and evaluating
the distribution of economic benefits to a specific geographic location. As an alternative, Dwyer
et al (2010) suggest public officials use community benefit assessments to measure a broad range
of economic factors, including social and environmental impacts, to understand better the
distribution of economic benefits within a defined geographic location (Dwyer et al., 2010).
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Measuring Economic Benefits through Community Benefit Assessments
A community benefit assessment involves segregating expenditures between those likely
associated with local business, and those associated with non-local entities. By organizing the
expenditures this way, it is possible to isolate the economic benefits accruing to local businesses
and residents, from those expenditures benefiting non-local entities. Table 4 presents how a
community benefits assessment can be structured. Sixty-seven (67) line-items from the various
department expense projections from the business class hotel model are summarized into 16
categories for this table and placed into three groups (local benefit, external benefit, and
unclassified). The local benefit category includes the portion of payroll supporting living wages1
and expenses paid to local businesses or government agencies. Slightly more than a quarter of
the hotel expenditures (27.5%) from the model provide local benefits. A majority of the
expenditures (55.5%) are made outside the community and provide external benefits to other
jurisdictions. The external benefits include investor returns and fees paid to franchisees
(marketing, management, revenue sharing), items that can be purchased in bulk, payments to
national service corporations, and business travel out of the area. The unclassified expenditures
represent the segment of the payroll which provides employees with sub-living wages. It is
undetermined how this segment of the payroll impacts the local community because it is
unknown how the individuals make up the gap in their wages. Seventeen percent (17%) of hotel
expenditures in the model are distributed to this unclassified segment. Appendix A provides
additional details on the wage composition of the workforce in this model.

1

The living wage is based on a single individual living alone as calculated by the MIT wage calculator.
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Table 4: Local and Non-Local Economic Beneficiaries
Category

Amount

Annual Revenue

$

2,528,521

Living Wages A

$

305,623

Local Utilities

$

128,207

Local food purchases

$

52,889

Taxes and Licenses

$

52,000

Local services

$

46,830

Maintenance

$

44,510

Charitable contributions

$

3,600

$

633,659

Profit & Fees B

$

818,406

Bulk Supplies

$

143,737

Marketing & Travel

$

50,126

Service contracts

$

49,252

Credit Card Commissions

$

40,548

Insurance

$

25,000

Guest relations

$

12,682

Miscellaneous

Local Benefit

Subtotal: Local Benefit

25.1%

External Benefit (Leakage)

$

35,872

Subtotal: External Benefit

$

1,175,623

46.5%

Unclassified C

$

359,275

14.2%

A. Four full-time and one part-time staff
B. Marketing, Franchise, Management fees
C. Sub-living wage payroll
Source data: Interim Hospitality Consultants 2011, Schedule 1, Page H-1

The local economic benefit of hotel spending in the IHC business class hotel model is
$633,885. It is worth noting here that an estimate of annual economic activity projected with an
input-output model, for this same group of expenditures, would be in the range of $4.0 million.2
This illustrates the vast difference between local economic activity and all economic activity

2

IHC consultants applied a multiplier of 1.94 to annual revenues on another hotel in the same geographical region to
estimate economic activity from that hotel.
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generated by tourism expenditures, and why some discourage public officials from using inputoutput models to support local public investment in tourism (Dwyer et al., 2010).
Measuring Economic Benefits from a Sustainability Perspective
Heterodox economists and sociologists have developed additional ways to measure the
distribution of economic activity within a community. These measures fall under the general
concept of economically sustainable development. The importance of sustainable development,
with both environmental and economic dimensions, emerged after a series of environmental
disasters in the 1970’s, and following sixteen years of study by the United Nations. The concept
was introduced in 1987 though the Brundtland Report (Brundtland Report, Our Common
Future, 1987, p. 41). The Commission defined the sustainable development this way,
“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains
within it two key concepts: the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the
world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations
imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to
meet present and future needs.”
Although the language in report does not provide operational definitions or measures for
economic or environmental sustainability, subsequent studies by researchers and public
organizations have suggested measures for these concepts.
Much of the work to define and measure sustainable economic activity comes from
quantitative methods used to study international tourism development. This research includes
efforts to measure local ownership, local business opportunities, and employee wage rates (Choi
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& Sirakaya, 2006; Franzoni, 2015; Garrigos-Simon et al., 2015). Professional organizations have
also defined and developed quantitative measures for economic sustainability. The United
Nations Environment Programme and World Trade Organization published a policy guide
specific to the tourism industry, with a stated goal to “ensure viable, long-term economic
operations, providing socio-economic benefits to all stakeholders that are fairly distributed,
including stable employment and income-earning opportunities and social services to host
communities, and contributing to poverty alleviation (Making Tourism More Sustainable: A
Guide for Policy Makers, 2005, p. 11). The American Planning Association, whose guidance on
sustainability primarily addresses non-economic issues, also issued guidelines for planners to
favor local businesses over out-of-area corporations, and “encourage businesses that meet human
needs fairly and efficiently (APA Policy Guide on Planning for Sustainability, 2000, p. 11;
Godschalk & Rouse, 2015).
Table 5 provides several examples of quantitative measures of sustainable economic
activity as identified by researchers and professional organizations.
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Table 5: Economic Sustainability Measures
Category

Measurements

Author

Employee

Comparative ratio of new wages to local average wage

Choi & Sirakaya

Income per capita of the resident population

Franzoni

Average income of a worker in the tourism sector

Franzoni

Rate of employment (by sector)

Franzoni

Ratio of part time to full time employment in tourism

Franzoni

Local unemployment rate in low season

Franzoni

% of employment of the community in the last three years

Franzoni

Percent of income leakage from the community

Garrigos-Simon

Entrepreneurial opportunities for residents

Garrigos-Simon et

Wages

Employment
Rate

Local
Businesses

al, Choi & Sirakaya

Taxes

Land-use

No. of tourism firms in the community

Franzoni

Longevity of tourism firms (rate of turnover)

Franzoni

Economic and social benefits (employment)

United Nations

Fulfill local employment and consumer needs without degrading the environment

APA

Promote financial and social equity in the workplace

APA

Income generated by the community

Franzoni

Local government revenue

Choi & Sirakaya

Revenue from income tax

Franzoni

Net tourism revenues accruing to the community

Franzoni

Revenue from business permits and taxation

Franzoni

Measure effects on existing business

United Nations

Utilization of existing business capacity

United Nations

Utilization of existing buildings

United Nations

Plans for after-use of sites.

United Nations

% of increase/decrease in the prices of land

Franzoni

Researchers have also used qualitative and mixed methods to explore dimensions of
sustainable economic activity. This literature contains both discrete measures and general
observations and tends to focus on how employment in the tourism sector impacts the well-being
of individuals and their social network. Case studies and ethnographies are common in these
studies. One group of researchers evaluated life expectancy at birth and literacy rates in
developing countries focused on tourism (Sanchez-Rivero et al., 2013). Another, studying
tourism development on the coast of Belize, measured the importance of tourism income to
family units, assessed how local elites shaped the economic benefits received by residents, and
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compared the number of residents self-employed in tourism related activities to those employed
by outside corporation (Belsky, 1999).
In summary, practitioners and academics are using a variety of methods and measures to
capture the private economic benefits of tourism. While profit, or net operating income, is of
primary concern to owners and investors, there are several other measures identified above
which are useful to gather descriptive data for policy makers considering public investments to
support the industry, or regulations to shape the distribution of economic benefits. Some of these
measures (i.e., local business ownership and participation, seasonal employment, ratio of parttime to full-time employment) are also valuable as independent variables to test forces which
may change the distribution of economic benefits within the industry.
What forces change the distribution of private economic benefits to improve wages?
Fainstein and Harvey identified the need to address the distribution of economic benefits
from tourism with the end to improve the wage structure in the industry (Fainstein, 2010;
Harvey, 2012). Tourism is comprised of several service sectors, which collectively, are receiving
significant attention by researchers concerned with living wages. The attention on service sector
wages has been heightened in the past three decades as the American economy has shifted from a
heavy manufacturing base to one consisting primarily of service sectors (Sherman, 2007; Stiglitz,
2015). However, there is a split among economists on the need for policies to lift service sector
wages. In a survey of 166 U.S. based economists conducted by the University of New
Hampshire, nearly three quarters of the respondents opposed raising the minimum wage to
$15.00 per hours and approximately half want the federal minimum wage eliminated or kept at
the same level. Support for raising the minimum wage falls roughly along political affiliation. A
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majority of respondents identifying as Republican or Independent support lowering or
maintaining the current minimum wage, while a majority of those identifying as Democrat
support raising the minimum wage to just above $10.00 (Fowler & Smith, 2015) .
Public officials are also reticent to address raising wages. At the state level, twenty-six state
legislatures have passed laws preempting local officials from even considering raising wages
(Huizar & Lathrop, 2019). In a survey of local officials engaged in economic development,
addressing matters of income inequality is the least important motivator for guiding policies and
program development (while promoting tourism was rated the second most important economic
development activity) (Economic Development 2014 Survey Results, 2014). Three of the largest
states for tourism, California, Florida and Virginia, while actively promoting business interests
within the industry, are silent in their planning documents on the wage structure of those working
in the industry.
In Florida’s strategic plan for tourism, the stated goal is to maximize the economic impact of
travel and tourism, with an objective to achieve $100 billion in tourism related spend by 2020
(2020 Strategic Plan, 2015). In the Commonwealth of Virginia, the responsibility for promoting
tourism falls to the Virginia Tourism Corporation (VTC). The corporation still operates under a
vision plan adopted in 2002. The goal of the plan is to increase tourism market-share and annual
visitor spending in Virginia, (Vision Plan for Virginia’s Tourism Industry, 2002). In California,
tourism officials set three goals in their 2012 strategic plan: 1) Garner approval of a 2013 statewide referendum on rental car assessments, 2) elevate legislators’ perceptions of the importance
of the industry, and 3) raise consumer perceptions of California and increase media chatter with
positive press articles that mention California and the economic benefits of travel (Visit
California’s Strategic Business Plan; 2011-2016, 2011). Strikingly, the missions, goals and
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objectives of all three states mention nothing of employee wages, even though the
accommodation sector (i.e., resorts, hotels, motels) is nested within the lowest paying industry
sector (accommodation and food services) in all three states (Table 6).
Table 6: Median Wages for Accommodation and Food Sector
Sector

California

Utilities

Florida

Virginia

$78,871

$53,973

$62,177

Professional, scientific, and technical services

65,591

48,115

80,199

Management of companies and enterprises

65,267

51,416

70,188

Public administration

61,441

45,624

71,295

Information

60,746

41,863

56,351

Finance and insurance

55,081

44,828

52,354

Manufacturing

44,133

38,634

44,335

Educational services

40,015

36,632

38,928

Wholesale trade

39,287

38,948

42,899

Real estate and rental and leasing

39,099

32,205

41,324

Transportation and warehousing

38,322

36,642

40,617

Health care and social assistance

36,951

32,407

33,895

Arts, entertainment, and recreation

24,541

22,409

17,262

Administrative and support and waste management services

23,708

22,705

26,444

Retail trade

22,660

21,292

21,686

Other services, except public administration

21,481

21,056

27,593

Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining:

20,581

20,948

31,508

Accommodation and food services

16,544

16,667

14,990

$34,818

$30,415

$38,396

48%

55%

39%

Civilian employed population median wage
Accommodation and food service: % of median wage
Data source: 2014 American Community Survey

Researchers concerned with addressing the wage structure problem in the service sector
focus on unions as an external force for change. There is ample evidence that collective
bargaining, strengthened by union membership, produces wage increases for employees (Card,
2001; Mishel & Walters, 2003; Vella & Verbeek, 1998). These wage benefits typically accrue to
lower skill levels often associated with tourism subsectors (Card, 1996; Freeman, 1980, 1982).
However, the wage benefits accruing to private sector union members has dropped significantly
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due to decreasing membership rates (Worker Voice in a Time of Rising Inequality, 2015).
Initially, the primary force driving down membership was adoption of the Taft Act in 1947.
More recently, declines in union membership are associated with the proliferation of State
legislation making it more difficult to organize and sustain union memberships (Ellwood & Fine,
1987). And today, many large private employers are adopting strong anti-organizing tactics to
further suppress union membership (Bronfenbrenner, 2009).
The federal inaction on increasing minimum wages and the private sector drive to
suppress collective bargaining has spurred community activism, often in partnership with labor
organizations, to promote local ordinances to raise wage levels (Levi et al., 2002; Reich et al.,
2014). One of the first successful cities to adopt a series of local wage ordinances was the CityCounty of San Francisco. Adopted in the early 1990’s, the city-county grounded their policies in
research on New Jersey’s action to raise their state minimum wage. The New Jersey study
surveyed 410 fast food restaurants in New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania and compared
employment growth between stores with a State-imposed wage increase (New Jersey) and those
without (Eastern Pennsylvania). That research found no measurable negative impact on
employment in the New Jersey restaurants resulting from the wage increase (Card & Krueger,
1994). An analysis of San Francisco’s wage ordinance, years after adoption, found similar results
– that the ordinances did not impact business operations (Reich et al., 2014, pp. 312–313).
Nevertheless, despite the early success of San Francisco and other cities adopting living wage
policies, just over 140 local governments employ some form of living wage program today. This
represents only a small fraction of the 25,000 local communities in the United States.
Determinants of a successful local wage campaigns are varied, with most efforts
succeeding in adopting some form of ordinance. Few campaigns fail. Some are derailed by State
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Legislatures or Courts (Adams & Neumark, 2005). In other cases, a lack of coordination with
union organizations is cited as the reason for failure to win adoption (Luce, 2005). For those
ordinances which have passed, troubles exist with effectiveness and execution. Effectiveness is
hampered by limitations written into the language of the ordinances. Exclusions and phasing of
wage increases limit effectiveness, and officials can undercut the ordinance through lax
enforcement or liberal granting of waivers. For these reasons, the benefits of adopting wage
ordinances are not measured solely by researchers with improvements to wages, but to related
improvements in union membership, contributions to national campaigns on wage issues, and
strengthening local alliances working on other social equity issues (Luce, 2012).
In addition to research focused on external forces suppressing tourism wages, several
qualitative researchers are studying internal forces within the industry which could influence
wage outcomes. This research, conducted primarily by sociologists, recognizes a unique aspect
of tourism employment. Some workers in the industry simultaneously produce a product and are
the product. The social interaction between hotel management and front desk workers and their
guests, or wait staff and restaurant customers is an important element measured and
commodified by business owners (Britton, 1991; Sherman, 2007; Urry, 1990). In contrast,
workers in the back of house (housekeeping and maintenance staff) provide physical labor and
are tasked with being invisible to guests (this invisible labor is usually comprised of immigrants
and minorities).
The tension between these two groups of laborers (front and back of house) was apparent
to Rachel Sherman during her qualitative research, as she immersed herself into hotel operations.
The front desk staff negotiated inequities with their guests by creating genuine relationships
which bolstered self-respect, while back of house labor had no such outlet and felt the full brunt
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of the inequity (Sherman, 2007). This difference in the hospitality workforce, applying the split
labor market theory of Edna Bonacich (Bonacich, 1972), could be an internal factor in
suppressing the wages of back of house workers. Additional discussion on the impact of split
labor markets on wages is discussed below in the section on theoretical frameworks associated
with the research questions.
How are public economic benefits distributed?
Taxes are the primary economic benefit of tourism to State and local governments. Hotel
owners pay property taxes and their transient occupants also pay sales tax on local purchases –
just like local residents. In addition, hotel occupants pay a transient occupancy tax based on their
daily room rate which is not imposed on permanent residents. These taxes are applied by local
and state governments. Some jurisdictions characterize the tax as a “sales” or “bed” tax. Since
transient occupants of hotels require no more public services than permanent residents, the
unique transient occupancy tax applied to hotel occupants is likely a source of profit for local and
state governments. This conclusion is why some researchers promote tourism taxes as a source
income which can be used to subsidize services to existing residents (Boley et al., 2014).
Table 7 replicates the projected tax revenue schedule from the IHC Business Class Hotel
Model (Interim Hospitality Consultants, 2013). The taxes collected exclusively on room revenue
and overall revenue for the hotel are $434,870. This excludes property tax paid by the hotel
($50,000 as identified in the supporting schedules) and any taxes paid by hotel guests at airports,
renting cars, purchasing gasoline, shopping in stores, dining in restaurants, or attending cultural
or sporting events. In this respect, the hotel tax revenue collected by local and state governments
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can be viewed as being more than what is necessary to provide public services to temporary
residents.
Hotel tax revenue, the primary public economic benefit, is similar in magnitude to the
annual private profit (NOI) of $572,301 estimated for the hotel investors (see Table 3). This tax
revenue is taken in by local and state governments, and then allocated to public purposes in the
annual or biannual budget process. This public economic benefit has the potential to address
concerns of social equity in the tourism sector. The use of the revenue, however, has not yet been
addressed in the planning literature.
Table 7: Projected Tax Revenues from a Proposed Business Class Hotel
Tax

Year 1

Rate
Room Revenue

$2,032,950

Total Revenue

$2,121,340

Occupancy Tax on Hotel Revenue
City of Montevallo

5%

$101,650

Shelby County

7%

$142,310

City of Montevallo

4%

$84,850

Shelby County

1%

$21,210

State of Alabama

4%

$84,850

Sales Tax on Total Revenues

Total Taxes

$434,870

Source: IHC Feasibility Study, Page H-10

How do natural amenities influence tourism development and taxation?
Fainstein and Harvey focus on the public investment in tourist attractions as justification to
address wage inequities in the industry. However, there is some literature which indicates that
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natural amenities are an important element of tourism development – as well as a source of
leverage for local government officials exploiting taxation powers.
Much of the literature connecting natural amenities with tourism comes from rural studies.
Rural communities, instead of building amenities for visitors, can focus on promoting natural
amenities as attractions (Halseth et al., 2010; Hassebrook, 2003) or leveraging interest in tours of
agri-business (e.g., wineries, farms and dairies) (Britton, 1991). John Penders and his
collaborators described this approach as “Amenity-Based Development.” They argue that “for
places with significant natural (or cultural) amenities such as mountains, lakes, and beaches, it
may be possible to increase local income and wealth, diversify the economy, and achieve more
sustainable rural development through increased tourism, recreation, and retirement
development” (Pender et al., 2012, p. 19).
Marcouiller et al (2004) in their research found that natural amenities are positively
associated with hotel activity. Their study used five separate scales to measure natural amenities
using various recreational activities associated with land-based, river-based, lake-based, warmweather, and cold-weather environments. Outcomes in tourism activity, as measured in three
states (Wisconsin, Minnesota and Michigan) were tourism employment, the number of tourism
firms, and retail service employment (Marcouiller et al., 2004).
Public choice economists recognize that strong natural amenities create an environment
which could lead to local government to leverage tax increases on residents. Brueckner and
Neumark posit that “in locations with strong amenities, public sector workers may have more
ability to extract rents [taxes], as these amenities drive wedges between the utility of taxpayers in
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different locations that public sector workers can exploit.” Their research confirmed this
hypothesis (Brueckner & Neumark, 2014).
Research Questions from the Literature Review
Using micro-simulation models to understand the economics of the hospitality subsector
responds in part to Fainstein’s charge to local government officials to provide the public with
accurate information on the distribution of private economic benefits within the tourism sector.
The models are instructive for assessing the economic benefits generated by hotel properties and
for understanding the wage structure in the local hospitality market. The distribution of public
economic benefits (hotel tax revenues) from the hospitality subsector, however, cannot be
addressed with an economic model of hotel operations. To address this line of inquiry, patterns
of public expenditures must be analyzed. Given the magnitude of the public economic benefits
potentially generated by the hospitality sector, and the lack of any research addressing this aspect
of the industry, one of the primary research questions of this dissertation is, how are public
economic benefits from the hospitality subsector being distributed? The other primary research
question goes to the role of natural amenities in hotel development and is, are natural amenities
an important element in the promotion and taxation of tourism?
Other research questions in this dissertation seek to test suppositions or explore
observations from the literature review relating to external and internal forces that impact wages.
Here then, in Table 8 below, are the proposed research questions, the sourcing of each question,
and where applicable, the theoretical framework which predict the direction of the hypotheses
associated with the subject question (the hypotheses are detailed in Chapter 3). The rationale for
choosing the theoretical frameworks follows the table below.
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Table 8: Research Questions, Sourcing and Theoretical Frameworks

Research Questions

Source

Theoretical Framework

1.

How are the public economic benefits of
the hospitality subsector distributed?

Gap in the literature.

Power to Tax Theory

2.

Are natural amenities an important
element in the promotion and taxation of
tourism?

Gap in the literature

Power to Tax Theory

3.

Have unions improved the wage
structure in their local hospitality
subsector?

Based on previous research findings.

Not applicable

4.

Do differences in race between front of
house and back of house employees in
the hospitality subsector reduce the
wages of back of house employees?

Based on field observations of Rachel
Sherman during her qualitative
research of hotel operations, and the
wage inequality research of Edna
Bonacich.

Wage Conflict: Split Labor
Market theory

Theoretical Frameworks to Predict Direction of Associations
Power to Tax Theory: Distribution of Public Economic Benefits
Although there is a significant gap in the literature exploring the distribution of public
economic benefits from the tourism industry, there are several economists who put forward
theories or articulate principles which could predict the use of these benefits. I review these
above in the introductory chapter. Of the options reviewed, the Power to Tax theory is selected to
predict the direction of the hypotheses associated with the distribution of public economic
benefits. Power to Tax theory, a product of public choice economics, suggests that public
officials will use the public economic benefits to enrich themselves, by increasing the number
and salaries of public employees. This theory is appropriate for this study for three reasons. First,
recognizing and addressing the negative influence of bureaucrats pursing their own self-interests
is supported in the public administration literature. H. George Frederickson, the first champion
for social equity in public administration, suggest identifying and rooting out self-interests in
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order to preserve credibility for government institutions (Frederickson, 1991). Second,
expenditures on local government employees (average salaries and total payroll) are measured
annually by the U.S. Government and therefore can be operationalized more accurately than
other potential uses (benevolent expenditures, spending on tourism promotion and marketing,
living wages, or employee profit sharing). And finally, recent studies by public choice
economists have tested the Power to Tax theory using government employee compensation as an
outcome variable (Brueckner & Neumark, 2014; Diamond, 2017). This dissertation can benefit
from these past efforts, and contribute to future research, through use of standardized variables
operationalizing government compensation (Gerring, 2012).
The previous Power to Tax-based studies by Brueckner, Neumark and Diamond posit that
certain conditions inhibit residents from migrating, or “voting with their feet,” in the face of
higher taxes. Charles Tiebout first advanced the proposition that residents controlled the level of
taxation in their community with the ability to migrate to another location (Tiebout, 1956). The
mobility inhibitors tested in these previous studies were natural amenities (Brueckner &
Neumark, 2014) and homogeneity in regional housing prices (Diamond, 2017). Brueckner and
Neumark posited that “in locations with strong amenities, public sector workers may have more
ability to extract rents [taxes], as these amenities drive wedges between the utility of taxpayers in
different locations that public sector workers can exploit” (Brueckner & Neumark, 2014). Local
amenities included mild climate, dry weather, proximity to coastal areas, and population density.
Diamond hypothesized that governments presiding over jurisdictions with less elastic housing
supplies (no option to move to nearby lower cost areas) are able to raise taxes without providing
taxpayers additional government services (Diamond, 2017). These studies, using Power to Tax
theory as a framework, posited that the higher tax revenues imposed on residents with limited
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mobility would in turn be used by local government officials to inflate their own salaries or
increase their numbers (the dependent variable in the studies). Government self-enrichment was
operationalized in these studies as local government wages per capita (Diamond, 2017) and the
differential between public and private sector wages (Brueckner & Neumark, 2014) with
counties or Metropolitan Statistical Areas serving as the unit of analysis. Cost of living variations
between communities was controlled using housing prices. Diamond’s findings on the
relationship between limitations on the mobility of residents and higher local government wages
per capita were statistically significant with a one (1) standard deviation increase in an MSA’s
land unavailability increasing government payrolls per county resident by 5.2 percent,
government full-time equivalents per county resident by 1.5 percent, and average government
worker wages by 3.7 percent.
One of the primary purposes of this dissertation proposal is to study the distribution of
public economic benefits from tourism. The presumption, based on Power to Tax theory, is that
public officials will use hotel tax revenues generated by tourism for self-enrichment. If the
findings are consistent with the Power to Tax theory, they will clarify, at least in part, how the
public economic benefits of tourism are being distributed. If this study determines that
government officials are using tourism development as a mechanism to distribute public
economic benefits for self-enrichment, the findings will become a significant element in the
policy debate on social equity within the industry. This type of finding would be of interest to
tourism employees, unions, and social equity advocates.
Wage Conflict Theory: Wage Suppression in Back-of-House Occupations:
Rachel Sherman, in her qualitative study of hotel operations, observed tension between
front-of-house (managers, front-desk) and back-of-house (housekeeping) employees. Sherman’s
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observations, in part, alluded to differences in race and nationality between these two groups
(Sherman, 2007). It is proposed to explore the implications of this observation by assessing any
wage differential between supervisors and employees in the housekeeping classification, based
on the racial disparity of these two groups. Although Sherman did not reference this in her study,
wage conflict theory suggests there would be a negative impact on wages for housekeeping
employees as the racial disparity between supervisors and employees increases. Due to
limitations in the availability of wage data by classification and industry, this analysis will
encompass housekeepers and housekeeper supervisors in all industry sectors. The
accommodation subsector is the largest user of the housekeeping classification (49%) and the
second largest user of the supervisor classification (21%) (Table 9).
Table 9: Distribution of Housekeeping Occupation Classifications by Industry
2016 Industry Employment

Housekeepers

Housekeeping Supervisors

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Traveler Accommodation

452,620

49%

33,390

21%

Services to Buildings and
Dwellings

115,040

12%

53,060

33%

General Medical and
Surgical Hospitals

102,560

11%

7,320

5%

Nursing Care Facilities
All other subsectors

69,330
185,090

7%
20%

6,030
61,340

4%
38%

Total Employment

924,640

100%

161,140

100%

Wage conflict theories are rooted in the works of Karl Marx. One of his theories states
the power of capital, controlled by the elite (bourgeois), over labor (the proletariat) is exercised
through means of production, with the objective being the exploitation of workers and
suppression of wages (Marx, 1867). Edna Bonacich’s split labor market theory is a variation of
wage conflict theory which addresses race and ethnicity. In this theory, labor is divided into two
groups based on the willingness to accept lower pay for the same job. The group willing to
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accept the lower pay is typically the ethnic or racial group marginalized by groups in power. The
split between marginalized wage earners, dominant wage earners, and businesses creates a threeclass system. The business wants to suppress all workers, the dominant wage earners want to
protect their premium wage, and the low-wage earners want to hold on to their job. This theory
suggests racial or ethnic tension between the two classes of wage earners as the business works
against both groups to suppress each of their wages (Bonacich, 1972).
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Chapter 3: Research Design, Methods & Data Preparation
Consistent with past studies that are being partially replicated here, the research questions
in this study will be addressed with a non-experimental associational design. It is nonexperimental because the independent variables cannot be manipulated and the interaction
between variables is only being tested for one group (there is no control group). It is
associational because the specific purpose of this design type is to explore relationships between
variables (Gerring, 2012). This study uses cross-sectional data collected at a single point in time.
A single cross section is used, in part, due to the use of mediated linear regression to answer, in
part, the primary research question. The study is conducted at the meso-level with the unit of
measure being MSAs for some (based on the limitation of unionization data), and the
geographical boundaries of counties for others (consistent with previous studies). The variables
of interest are operationalized, where possible, based on approaches used in previous studies to
bolster internal validity. The research design is depicted by the symbols:
N O
The single row indicates there is only one group in the study. The “N” indicates the cases
in the single group (MSAs/counties) will be selected naturally. The single O” indicates data was
collected at a single point in time.
Table 10 provides a summary of the research questions, the testable hypothesis proposed
to answer each question, and notes on the direction of association. Following this table, detailed
information is provided on datasets, operational definitions for each variable, and diagrams
illustrating the proposed statistical tests.
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Table 10: Overview of Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Question

Hypotheses

Notes

1.

How are the public economic
benefits of the hospitality
subsector distributed?

H1: Counties with higher levels of per capita hotel
revenue will have higher levels of per capita local
government wages.

H1 is the primary focus of
this study. The direction of
association is based on
Power to Tax Theory.

2.

Are natural amenities an
important element in the
promotion and taxation of
tourism?

H2: Counties with higher scores on the USDA Natural
Amenities Scale will have higher per capita hotel
revenue.

H2 and H3 replicate previous
studies and comprise two
paths (H1 is the third) of a
mediated linear regression
analysis.

H3: Counties with higher scores on the USDA
Natural Amenities Scale will have higher levels of
per capita local government wages.
H4: County scores on the USDA Natural Amenities
Scale will not influence per capita local government
wages independent of its effect on per capita hotel
revenue (conditioned on confirmation of preceding
hypotheses).

H4 tests whether a previously
established association (H3)
is mediated by per capita
hotel revenue.

H5: Rural counties with higher levels of per capita
hotel revenue will have higher levels of per capita
local government wages than urban counties.

The direction of association
is based on Power to Tax
Theory. Rural governments
can direct more tax revenue
for self-enrichment because
they do not have to build
attractions.
The direction of association
is based on previous
literature cited in Chapter 2.

3.

Have unions improved the
wage structure in their local
hospitality subsector?

H6: MSA’s with higher levels of union membership
will have higher levels of accommodation subsector
wages.

4..

Do differences in race
between front of house and
back of house employees in
the hospitality subsector
suppress the wages of back of
house employees?

H7: MSA’s with a higher differential in racial
composition between housekeeping supervisors and
housekeeping employees will have lower
housekeeping wages.

The direction of association
is based on split labor market
theory.

Research Hypotheses (H1 – H7)
There are seven research hypotheses associated with the four research questions. Each
hypothesis is presented below and followed with a diagram illustrating the relationships being
tested.
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Hypothesis 1 addresses the first research question; 1) How are the public economic
benefits of the hospitality subsector distributed? Based on power to tax theory, the hypothesis
posits that public hospitality subsector benefits, as measured by per capita hotel revenue (a proxy
for local hotel taxes), is positively associated with higher per capita local government wages
(Figure 3):
H1: Counties with higher levels of per capita hotel revenue will have higher levels of
per capita local government wages
The second, third, fourth and fifth research hypotheses for this study are associated with
the second question; 2) Are natural amenities an important element in the promotion and
exploitation of tourism? Hypothesis 2 partially replicates a previous study and tests the direct
association between natural amenities and tourism. Hypothesis 3 also partially replicates a
previous Power to Tax based study which tests the association between natural amenities and
local government wages. The fourth hypothesis combines the first three hypotheses to assess,
through mediated linear regression, whether per capita hotel revenue is the mechanism which
links the association between natural amenities and higher per capita local public wages. The
conceptual diagram for this analysis is depicted in Figure 2. Hypothesis 2 is the first path in this
mediation model (path a) and is predicted based on the previous research of Marcouiller et al
(2004) and posits that natural amenities are positively associated with hotel revenues.
H2: Counties with higher scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will have
higher per capita hotel revenue.
The second path in this mediation model (path b) is the test of Hypothesis 1 (from above)
with a predicted positive relationship between hotel wages per capita and per capita local
government wages.
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Hypothesis 3 is the third path in this mediation model (path c) and is predicted based on
the previous research of Brueckner and Neumark (2014) and posits that natural amenities are
positively associated with per capita local government wages:
H3: Counties with higher scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will have
higher levels of per capita local government wages.
The fourth path in this mediation model (path ab) tests whether or not hotel revenue is the
mechanism that mediates the relationship between natural amenities and higher per capita local
government wages. Since high levels of natural amenities are a logical antecedent to tourism
development, and tax revenues from tourism (hotels, retail sales, car rentals, etc.) are necessary
to boost local government salaries, the hypothesis is that tourism activity (as measured by hotel
revenue) will be the mechanism that mediates the relationship between natural amenities and
higher per capita local government wages:
H4: County scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will not influence per capita
local government wages independent of its effect on hotel revenue per capita.3
This hypothesis will be tested using mediated linear regression (PROCESS Model 4)
(Hayes, 2018, p. 585).

The language used in this hypothesis is modeled after language from Andrew Hayes’ Introduction to Mediation,
Moderation and Conditional Process Analysis (Hayes, 2018, p. 518).
3
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Figure 2: Conceptual Diagram of Statistical Test for Hypotheses #1 - #4

Hypothesis 5 also addresses the second research question. The literature suggests that
rural areas require less public investment in built amenities to attract tourists. Rural areas can
rely on existing natural amenities and agritourism to draw in tourists. This reliance on existing
assets could permit local government officials to direct more public economic benefits, based on
Power to Tax theory, towards their own self-enrichment.
H5: There will be a stronger positive relationship between per capita hotel revenue and
per capita local government wages in Mostly Rural and Rural counties as compared to Mostly
Urban counties.
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Figure 3: Conceptual Diagram of Statistical Test (with split file) for Hypothesis #5

Hypothesis 6 addresses part of the third research question; Have unions improved the
wage structure in their local hospitality subsector? This hypothesis explores the supposition by
Fainstein that unions can have a positive impact on wages in the tourism sector (Figure 4).
H6: MSA’s with higher levels of union membership will have higher levels of
accommodation subsector wages.
Figure 4: Conceptual Diagram of Statistical Test for Hypothesis #6

The seventh hypothesis, using wage conflict theory, addresses internal forces affecting
the wages of a classification popular in the hospitality subsector: housekeepers and maids. It
answers the question: Do differences in race between housekeeping supervisors and
housekeepers suppress the wages of housekeepers? This hypothesis predicts that, based on split-
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labor market theory, wages of housekeepers will be lower when there is a greater differential in
race between housekeeping supervisors and housekeepers (Figure 5).
H7: Counties with a higher differential in racial composition between housekeeping
supervisors and housekeeping employees will have lower housekeeping wages.

Figure 5: Conceptual Diagram of Statistical Test for Hypothesis #7

Operational Definitions and Data Sets for Variables of Interest
As they appear in order above, below is an explanation of how each variable in this study is
operationalized.
Per Capita Hotel Revenue (proxy for hotel taxes): Marcouiller et al (2004) in their study
of tourism activity in three states (Wisconsin, Minnesota and Michigan) operationalized tourism
activity using tourism employment, the number of tourism firms, and retail service employment.
The challenge with these measurements of tourism activity is that they are not easily replicated
for the national scope of this study. The tourism “industry” is not a defined industry sector in the
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Tourism-related economic activity is
spread across multiple subsectors in the NAICS system – most of which serve both tourists and
local residents. This process of splitting activities between tourists and local residents introduces
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potential reliability and validity concerns. The only subsector that is allocated entirely (100%) to
the tourism industry is the accommodation subsector (i.e., hotels, resorts, bed and breakfast).
Therefore, for this study, operationalization of tourism activity will focus on data collected from
the accommodation subsector.
Data on employment, payroll, and revenue for the accommodation subsector is collected
by the U.S. Government at the local government level. Of these three data elements, hotel
revenue is the best fit for this study. Hotel revenue is a good fit since it is used by local
governments to assess (collect) local occupancy taxes. The Economic Census provides hotel
revenue data. The Economic Census is the major source of facts about the structure and
functioning of the United States economy. The producers of this data set, the United States
Census Bureau, state that “The local governments use the data to assess business activities and
tax bases within their jurisdictions, as well as to develop programs to attract business,” and that
trade associations use the data to “study trends in their own and competing industries, which
allows them to keep their members informed of market changes” (Economic Survey, 2012). Data
from the 2012 Economic Census will be used in this study. The revenue will be divided by the
2012 county populations to produce hotel revenue per capita.
Hotel revenue estimates are available for 1,813 counties or county equivalents through
the Economic Census. The availability of hotel revenue data is limited by non-responses to data
requests (215 non-responsive counties) and privacy concerns (1,114 counties). Privacy concerns
exist where there are a limited number of hotels in a county, and release of the revenue data
would permit users to associate revenue with specific hotels (“Economic Census: Reliability of
Data,” 2019). This dataset, therefore, is potentially a limiting factor for the number of counties
which can be studied. Estimating processes to replace missing data are detailed below.
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Per Capita Local Government Wages (proxy for local government self-enrichment):
Diamond operationalized local government self-enrichment using per capita payrolls for local
governments. This study uses a similar measurement. Local government payrolls (NAICS code
92/Type 3) for each county are derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of
Employment Wages (Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 2014). The annual payrolls
for 2014 are used for each county. This allows for a two-year lag, as suggested by Warner
(Warner, 2013), for the local government to collect and allocate (through the budget process)
hotel revenue for potential self-enrichment. This data was then transformed into a per capita
basis using 2014 population data from the American Community Survey.
Median Gross Rent (Control Variable): To address a competing explanation for high local
government wages, the local cost of living (using housing cost as a proxy) is used as a control
variable. This is consistent with similar research conducted by Diamond (2017) and Brueckner et
al (2014). Monthly median gross housing rent (Table B25064 of the ACS) serves as a proxy for
cost of living. The presumption here is with a higher the cost of living (using gross rent as a
proxy), local governments will have to offer higher salaries to recruit and retain employees.
Housing costs were also used as the control variable in the Brueckner and Neumark study
(Brueckner & Neumark, 2014).
USDA Natural Amenities Scale: Natural amenities were operationalized by Brueckner and
Neumark with four individual scales: mild weather, dry weather, proximity to a major body of
water, and population density (Brueckner & Neumark, 2014). Marcouiller et al (2014) use five
separate scales to measure natural amenities using various recreational activities associated with
land-based, river-based, lake-based, warm-weather, and cold-weather environments. For this
study a single standardized scale, which incorporates elements from both Brueckner and
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Marcouiller, will be used to operationalize natural amenities – the Natural Amenities Scale
produced by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service.
The USDA describes their Natural Amenities Scale as:
“a measure of the physical characteristics of a county area that enhance the location as a
place to live. The scale was constructed by combining six measures of climate,
topography, and water area that reflect environmental qualities most people prefer. These
measures are warm winter, winter sun, temperate summer, low summer humidity,
topographic variation, and water area (Natural Amenities Scale, 2018).”
The USDA provides data for counties or county equivalents in the lower 48 States. Counties
in Hawaii and Alaska are excluded, so the available cases are 3,111. The USDA cites the
unavailability of data as the reason for excluding Hawaii and Alaska from their dataset. For the
continental U.S. The dataset contains the original measures and standardized scores for each
county. The level of analysis for the scale is interval, with scores ranging from a high of 11.17
(Ventura County, CA) to a low of -6.4 (Red Lake County, MN) (Natural Amenities Scale, 2018).
The scale has been used in previous studies testing migration patterns of people between
geographic regions in the United States (Hunter et al., 2005; Nelson, 2006).
Union Membership: The percentage of union membership at the state and metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) in both the public and private sector is collected by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Barry Hirsch of Georgia State University and David Macpherson of Trinity University
organize this data for researchers and make it available on the web at unionstats.gsu.edu.
Hotel Employee Wages: The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides wages by
employee classification. Narrowing the focus to just front-line employees, the subject of this
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study, comes with some limitations. Data on wages for front-line classifications (i.e., front desk
clerk, housekeeper) is only available by industry at the State level. However, some classifications
are highly concentrated in certain industries. For example, 94% of the hotel desk clerk positions
nationally are in the accommodation subsector. Furthermore, the mean wages of hotel desk
clerks in the accommodation subsector are within .02% of the average of hotel desk clerks from
all industries (as measured at the State level). Therefore, the hotel desk clerk wages were
selected at the Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Area level for all industries and used as
a proxy for front-line wages in the accommodation subsector. The 2016 wage data for hotel desk
clerks (Classification 43-4081) was obtained from the Occupational Employment Statistics
(OES) Survey conducted by the BLS. This permits a two year period between the independent
(union participation) and dependent variable (hotel desk clerk wages) per the recommendation of
Warner (Warner, 2013).
Difference in racial composition between housekeeping supervisors and housekeeping
workforce: This will be measured by the difference between the percentage of white
housekeeping supervisors (Occupation Code 37-1011) and white housekeeping employees
(Occupation Code 37-2012). This data is drawn from a unique component of the 2010 American
Community Survey and is sponsored by four Federal agencies: 1) the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 2) the Employment Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division at
the Department of Justice, 3) the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs at the
Department of Labor, and 3) the Office of Personnel Management. Although racial composition
of classifications is available at the industry subsector level with the 2010 data set, the wages for
these classifications are not available by industry. Therefore, the racial disparity will be
calculated across all industries for the subject classifications. The accommodation subsector is
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the largest user of the housekeeping classification and the second largest user of the
housekeeping supervisor classification (Table 9). There is no known literature in which this
theory (split labor market) is operationalized.
2010 Housekeeping wages: The 2010 wage data for housekeeping and maids
(Classification 37--2012) was obtained from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES)
Survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The wages represent the average
across all industries – consistent with the make-up of the independent variable (racial disparity
between housekeeping supervisors and employees).
Urban-Rural Split: There are several ways to split geographical designations into either
urban or rural classifications. All classifications start with census data on population density and
land coverage collected at the finest geographical area – the census tract (i.e., blocks). Census
tracts are defined as urban if the population density is more than 1,000 residents per square mile.
Adjustments are made to this threshold if there are large public spaces in the census tract (i.e.,
parks, airports, cemeteries). Any census tract not defined as urban is by default rural. One option
to classifying the urban or rural character of counties involves calculating the percentage a
population living in either an urban or rural census tract within the county. Using this approach,
the Census Bureau has established three ways to define counties: Mostly urban, mostly rural, and
completely rural (Ratcliffe et al., 2016). These are the three categories of “urban” and “rural”
which will be used in this study.
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A summary of all variables and sources is provided in Table 11.
Table 11: Data Sources for Variables
Role

Variable

Level of Measurement
& Unit of Analysis

Source

Year

Association of Natural Amenities & Hotel Revenue with Higher Local Government Wages
Y: Dependent

Local Government
Salaries Per Capita

Ratio/County

Bureau of Labor Statistics:
NAICS 92 (Local only)
American Community
Survey 2014 Population
2012 Economic Census:
NAICS 721
American Community
Survey 2012 Population
United States Department of
Agriculture

2014

X: Independent &
M: Mediator

Hotel Revenue Per Capita

Ratio/County

X: Independent

Natural Amenities Scale

Interval/County

X: Independent

Rural Classification

Categorical/County

United States Department of
Agriculture

2010

Control

Housing Cost (Median
Gross Rent)

Ratio/County

American Community
Survey 5-year estimates
2010-2014; Table B25064

2014

Occupational Employment
Statistics Survey, Bureau of
Labor Statistics
Unionstats.gsu.edu
(compilation of Bureau of
Labor data)
American Community
Survey 5-year estimates
2012-2016; Table B25064

2016

Occupational Employment
Statistics Survey, Bureau of
Labor Statistics
American Community
Survey (EEO-ALL01W)
NAICS 721

2010

American Community
Survey 5-year estimates
2006-2010; Table B25064

2010

2012

2010

Association of Unionization with Tourism Wages
Y: Dependent

Hotel Clerk Wages

Ratio/MSA

X: Independent

Unionization

Ratio/MSA

Control

Housing Cost (Median
Gross Rents)

Ratio/MSA

2014

2014

Association of Racial Disparity in Workforce and Housekeeping Wages
Y: Dependent

Housekeeping Employee
wages

Ratio/MSA

X: Independent

Difference in Racial
Composition of
Housekeeping
Supervisors and
Housekeeping Employees

Ratio/MSA

Control

Housing Cost (Median
Gross Rents)

Ratio/MSA
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Data Analysis Techniques
All hypotheses, except Hypothesis 4, will be tested with linear regression using IBM’s
SPSS software (Version 26). Hypothesis 4 will be tested using the PROCESS module (model 4)
for SPSS developed by Andrew Hayes (Hayes, 2018). This module permits the testing of a
mediated linear regression model in a single analysis.
Hypothesis 5 uses the same data sets as Hypothesis 1, expect that data will be split into
mostly urban, mostly rural and rural categories. The differences between the tests for each group
will be compared.
Validity, Reliability and Limitations
The research design is non-experimental/associational using cross-sectional data. Nonexperimental designs, while very common in the literature, are problematic because of a lack of a
comparator group and an intervention (Gorard, 2013) – neither of which can be introduced into
this study. The limitation of this design is mitigated by careful construction and alignment of the
design and methods.
The proposed research design and methods were carefully constructed, framed in existing
theory, and rooted in existing literature to minimize bias (de Vaus, 2001; Gorard, 2013; Shadish
et al., 2002). The research design and methods align the problem statement, theoretical
framework, research questions, testable hypotheses, operationalized variables of interest, data
collection and statistical analysis. The problem identified is the inequitable distribution of
economic benefits from tourism. The gap in the literature which is addressed in the research
design is clarifying the public sector’s distribution of economic benefits from tourism. The
theoretical framework selected to explore this gap is Power to Tax theory, which predicts that
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public officials will use public economic benefits from tourism (taxes) to enrich their own
numbers and compensation. One of the testable hypotheses that follows posits, in general terms,
that higher levels of hotel revenue in a county (a proxy for hotel tax revenue accruing to the
county) will be associated with higher expenditures on local government salaries.
The concepts addressed in the study (i.e., tourism, self-enrichment, etc.) are
operationalized in many cases by using established measurement scales or drawn from other
studies which are partially replicated. The partial replication of other studies and the use of
existing measurement scales strengthens the internal and external validity of the measurements,
and the use of established secondary data sets also strengthens the reliability of the
measurements. All variables are measured at the interval or ratio level, permitting more precise
measurement and more options for advanced statistical techniques (Gerring, 2012). There is no
logical or theoretical basis for testing reciprocal associations between the key variables.
There are reliability concerns with the dataset used for hotel revenue and union
membership. The technical notes for the 2012 Economic Census, the source of hotel revenue,
indicates the presence of non-sampling errors and a significant percentage of the values are
imputed. Revenue data was collected from 2,927 of the potential 3,143 counties and county
equivalents. However, due to privacy concerns, data for 1,114 of these counties is masked,
leaving only 1,813 cases (counties) with actual revenue data. Furthermore, of the cases with
accessible data, 34 have an imputation rate above 50%, 115 cases have imputation rates between
25% and 50%, and 352 cases have imputation rates between 10% and 25% (Economic Census:
Reliability of Data, 2019). Despite these weaknesses, the Economic Census is widely regarded as
the best business census in the world (Boettcher & Gaines, 2004) .
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The unionization data is presented at the MSA level (n=264) based on the disaggregation
of BLS data by Hirsch and Macpherson (Hirsch & Macpherson, 2019). The BLS does not
disaggregate the data due to concerns about sample size. Using BLS data only would limit
analysis to unionization data aggregated at the state level (n=50). The smaller population of BLS
data, and the heterogeneity of data likely coming from larger states, is viewed as a greater
limitation than the sample size concerns with the larger MSA data set prepared by Hirsch and
Macpherson.
Assessment of Findings
Using power to tax theory as a theoretical framework, the primary purpose of this study is to
study the relationship between natural amenities, tourism (using hotel revenues as a proxy) and
higher local government employee salaries. Previous research has studied the association of
natural amenities and tourism, and natural amenities and higher local government employee
salaries. The relationship between natural amenities and tourism was established also using
different data sets than in this study. The relationship between hotel revenues and higher local
government employee wages, and potentially, the mediating influence of hotel revenues between
natural amenities and higher wages will be tested in this study and address a gap in the literature.
If research hypotheses 1 and 4 are validated, the findings will provide additional support for the
Power to Tax theory and clarify, at least in part, how the public economic benefits of tourism are
being derived and distributed.
The answer to these research questions could provide the necessary context to address some
of the problems identified by Fainstein and Harvey on the allocation of benefits in the tourism
industry. The answers may also reveal, as Power to Tax theory suggests, that solving the wage
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problem in the tourism industry may not simply involve unions negotiating with the private
sector, but rather, there could be a significant opportunity for advocates to challenge the
allocation of excess tax revenues by local governments. These findings would be of interest to
tourism employees, unions, and social equity advocates. Conversely, if there is no connection
between tourism and public employee wages, the findings will challenge support for the Power
to Tax theory.
Data Preparation: H1 through H5
The following sections detail the data preparation for each of the hypotheses. The data
cleaning process applied to all data is outlined in Appendix B. The process is based on
recommendations in Tabachnick & Fidell for ungrouped data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). The
format of this section includes a numerical/alphabetical sequence to permit easier tracking of the
steps taken in the data preparation process. There are four sections for each hypothesis. Section 1
covers the univariate screening for each variable. The variables are further itemized by lower
case letters (i.e., a, b, c, etc.). Section 2 covers the bivariate screening. Section 3 includes the
multivariate screening and finally Section 4 provides a summary of missing data and limitations.
Appendix C provides graphs and tables used during the data screening process.
1. Data Acquisition and Univariate Screening
a. Dependent Variable: Local Government Wages per Capita (H1 and H3)
Local government wages per capita for 2014 is a computed variable which takes total
local government wages for a county divided by the population for the county. The data source
for local government wages is the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the source for population is the
Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (5 year). There are 3,143 counties in the United
States. There was one case (Bedford City, VA) missing data for population. The 2012 population
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for this case was used to replace the missing data. There were 337 cases missing data for local
government wages. To estimate values for missing local government wages, wage data between
the years 2010 and 2015 were reviewed to identify values from which to extrapolate a 2014
estimate. For example, if there was data available in 2013 and 2015 for the case, the value for
2014 was computed by taking the average of 2013 and 2015. Using this approach, 148 values
were estimated for cases with missing data. After this process there were 189 cases (6.0%)
remaining with missing values. The two values were then combined by dividing local
government wages with population to compute a local government wages per capita variable.
There were 2,954 cases out of a possible 3,143 to continue with the screening process.
Z scores were prepared for all cases. There were 34 cases with Z scores above 3.3. These
cases were evaluated for input errors and extreme outliers. Finding none, all 2,954 cases were
analyzed for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: 4.05) and visual
inspection of a histogram revealed a strong positive skewness to the data. The common log of the
data was calculated to transform the data to a near-normal distribution (skewness:.808). Graphs
and tables associated with this review and transformation are available in the appendix (Figures
C-1 and C-2, Table C-1).
b. Independent/Dependent/Mediating Variable: Hotel Revenue per Capita (H1, H2 &
H4 )
Hotel revenue per capita for 2012 is a computed value which takes hotel revenue in a
county divided by the population of the county. Hotel revenue data comes from the Economic
Survey data set collected by the Census Bureau and population data comes from the American
Community Survey. About 44%, or 1,330 of the 3,143 counties are missing hotel revenue data in
the 2012 Economic Survey is missing – either supressed for confidentialy purposes or non-
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reported. There are1113 counties without data due to confidentiality concerns and 217 counties
due to non-responses to the survey.
A two-step process was used to estimate suppressed or missing data. First, hotel
employment was estimated for each case using data from the County Business Patterns data set.
This data is collected annually and provides a range of employees for cases with suppressed data.
This estimating process involved solving for the difference between actual state totals (every
state has an actual employment total) and actual county data and then allocating the difference
among the counties with missing data. The second step was to multiply the mean revenue per
employee from actual data ($74,847 in hotel revenue/per employee) with the estimated employee
total to produce a replacement revenue value. One thousand one hundred and eleven (1,111)
cases were populated with estimated values through this process. Employees are a valid
component of this estimating process because there is high correlation between hotel employees
and hotel revenue among actual data (ρ .989, see Table C-2). Estimating employees using ranges
provided in the County Business Patterns to address missing data is a common practice
(Isserman & Westervelt, 2006).
Z scores were prepared for all cases. There were 24 cases with Z scores above 3.3. These
were reviewed for input errors and extreme outliers. Finding none, all 2,926 cases were analyzed
for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness:23.40) and visual inspection of a
histogram revealed a strong positive skewness to the data. The common log (Log 10) of the data
was calculated to transform the data to a near-normal distribution (skewness: .349). Graphs and
tables with data associated with this review and transformation are available in the appendix
(Figures C-3 and C-4, Table C-3).

62

The Just Host
c. Independent Variable: Natural Amenities Scale (H2, H3 and H4)
The Natural Amenities Scale dataset was acquired from a webpage maintained by the
United States Department of Agriculture. The data was downloaded in the form of an Excel
spreadsheet. The data included raw data and Z-scores for six components of the scale: January
temperature, January sunshine, June Temperature, June humidity, topography, and percentage of
water coverage. The scale is based on the sum of these six Z-scores. There were 35 cases with
missing data. Alaska (29), Hawaii (5), and Colorado (Broomfield County) were missing data.
The values for a city within Broomfield County were used to replace the missing data for that
county. The USDA did not include Alaska and Hawaii in their scale citing the unavailability of
data for counties in those two states. Values for these states were not estimated.
Z scores were calculated for the Natural Amenities Scale. Twenty-two cases (22) were
over 3.3 standard deviations from the mean in either direction. These were reviewed for input
errors and extreme outliers. Finding none, all 3,108 cases were analyzed for normality of
distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: .951) and visual inspection of a histogram (Figure
C-5) revealed a near normal distribution, so no transformation was necessary.
d. Split-file Categorical Variable: Urban-Rural Classifications (H5)
Rural classification data was acquired from U.S. Census Bureau. This data is contained in
an Excel spreadsheet and provides the percent of population in each county (from 0% to 100%)
that is designated as rural. The data is based on 2010 populations. The data also places each
county in one of three categories: Mostly Urban, Mostly Rural, and Rural. Mostly Urban
counties are less than 50% rural, Mostly Rural counties are more than 50% rural, but not 100%
rural and Rural counties are those with 100% of the population being rural. There were two
counties missing data. Based on population, these were placed in the Rural category. No
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percentage was assigned to these counties. The breakdown between classification is Mostly
Urban: 1,253, Mostly Rural: 1,185, and Rural: 704.
e. Control Variable: Median Gross Rent (H1, H3, and H4)
Median Gross Rents for all counties for 2014 from the American Community Survey
(Table ID B25064) was downloaded via the Census Bureau website. The data was downloaded
in an Excel spreadsheet, which in turn was imported into SPSS. There were 3,143 cases within
the United States. No missing values were identified.
Z scores were prepared for all cases. There were 45 cases with Z scores above 3.3. These
were cases reviewed for errors and extreme outliers. Finding none, all 3,143 cases were analyzed
for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: 1.70) and visual inspection of a
histogram revealed a strong positive skewness to the data. The Log 10 of the data was calculated
to transform the data to a near-normal distribution (skewness: .703). See Figure C-6, Table C-4
and Figure C-7 for more details.
2. Bivariate Screening of County-based Variables
Scatter plots were prepared with:
a) Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) and Log (Local Government Wages per
Capita) (Figure C-8),
b) Natural Amenities and Log (Local Government Wages Per Capita) (Figure C9),
c) Natural Amenities and Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) (Figure C-10), and
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d) Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) and Log (Median Gross Rent)
(Figure C-11).
Based on visual inspection of these scatterplots, twelve (12) outliers were removed from
further analysis (Table C-5).
3. Multivariate Screening for County-based Variables
H1: Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of Log (Hotel Revenue
per Capita) to predict Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) after controlling for the
influence of cost of living [Log (Median Gross rent)]. A preliminary regression analysis was
conducted to identify multivariate outliers. Five cases which exceeded a Mahalanobis value of
16.23 were removed from the final analysis.
H2: A preliminary regression analysis was conducted to identify multivariate outliers.
Four (4) cases which exceed the Mahalanobis cutoff value of 13.82 were removed from the final
analysis.
H3: A preliminary regression analysis was conducted to identify multivariate outliers.
Twenty-four (24) cases which exceed the Mahalanobis cutoff value of 16.23 were removed from
the final analysis.
H4: This hypothesis is tested with a statistical model (PROCESS Model 4) which does
not employ multivariate outlier screening.
H5: This hypothesis tests Hypothesis 1 with a split file based on urban-rural categories.
All multivariate outliers from Hypothesis #1 were removed prior to the final statistical analysis.
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4. Summary of Missing Data & Limitations
After replacing missing data for most cases, there remains 186 cases (6%) missing data
for Local Government Wages per Capita, 217 cases (7%) missing Hotel Revenue per Capita, 33
cases (1.1%) missing data for Natural Amenities, and no cases missing Median Gross Rent.
Little’s MCAR test was conducted, and it was determined that the missing data was not random
(p<.000). As previously states, the missing Natural Amenities data was from Hawaii and Alaska.
The counties missing Hotel Revenue per Capita data average approximately 7,000 in population,
while counties with data average approximately 100,000. Likewise, counties missing Local
Government Wages per Capita data tend to have smaller populations than counties with data.
The average population of counties missing wage data is approximately 50,000, while counties
with data have populations averaging approximately 100,000. Based on the distribution of
missing data, the findings in this study are generally applicable to larger cities within the
continental United States.
Data Preparation: H6
1. Data Acquisition and Univariate Screening
a. Dependent Variable: Hotel Desk Clerk Wages
The 2016 wage data for hotel desk clerks (Classification 43-4081) was obtained from the
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) Survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). The data comes from BLS in an Excel spreadsheet and then was imported into SPSS.
There are 369 Metropolitan Statistical Areas with data (out of 381) for Desk Clerk wages. Only
six (6) of the 552 Micropolitan Statistical Areas had wage data. There is no estimating process
available to replace missing data for Micropolitan Areas, so these cases are trimmed from the
dataset to focus further analysis on Metropolitan Statistical Areas.
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Z scores were prepared for all cases. There were 5 cases with Z scores above 3.3. These
were cases assessed for accuracy and extreme outliers. All were accurate, but two wages
(Kahului-Wailuku-Lahaina and Urban Honolulu, HI) were over 6 Standard Deviations from the
mean. These extreme outliers were filtered out of further analysis. The remaining 367
Metropolitan Statistical Areas were analyzed for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics
(skewness: 1.43) and visual inspection of a histogram revealed a small positive skewness to the
data. The Square root and Log 10 of the data was calculated to assess the potential improvement
in the distribution of the data. These transformations did not substantially improve the
distribution (SQRT skewness: 1.207, Log 10 Skewness:.999), so no changes were made to the
variable. See figures C-12 and C-13.
b. Independent Variable: Private Union Membership
Union density data was obtained from unionstats.com by downloading an excel
spreadsheet with 2016 MSA data. This data was imported into SPSS and analyzed for missing
data. There are 260 MSA’s with data for private union membership rates. No method was
identified to estimate missing data for the 121 MSAs missing data. To assess the nature of the
missing data, the MSAs were divided into three equally sized groups (127 each) by population.
There was one case missing data for the 127 in the top group (0.8%), twenty-six (26) cases
missing data for the 127 in the middle group (20.5%), and ninety four (94) cases missing data for
the 127 cases in the lowest group (76%). To reduce the non-randomness of the missing data, the
thirty-three (33) cases with data in the bottom third were removed, leaving 254 cases (211 with
Union Membership Data) for study in high and middle population groups. These represent MSAs
with a population over 160,000.
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The remaining 211 Metropolitan Statistical Areas with Private Union Membership Data
were analyzed for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: 2.004) and visual
inspection of a histogram revealed a strong positive skewness to the data. The Log 10 of the data
was calculated to assess the potential improvement in the distribution of the data. This
transformation reduced the improve the distribution (Log 10 Skewness: -352), so the data was
transformed with a Log 10. See Figures C-14 and C-15.
c. Control Variable: Median Gross Rent
Median Gross Rents for all MSAs for 2016 from the American Community Survey
(Table ID B25064) was downloaded via the Census Bureau website. The data was downloaded
in an Excel spreadsheet, which in turn was imported into SPSS. There was rent data for all 211
cases with union participation data (the dependent variable).
Z scores were prepared for all cases. There were 5 cases with Z scores above 3.3. These
were assessed for errors and extreme outliers. Finding none, no cases were filtered out based on
this review. All cases were analyzed for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics
(skewness: 1.60) and visual inspection of a histogram revealed a positive skewness to the data.
The data was transformed using the square root and log 10 of the data to produce a more normal
distribution. The square root produced a skewness of 1.26 and the log 10 produced a skewness of
.906. The log 10 of the data was selected for use in the statistical analysis (see Figures C-16 and
C-17 for histograms of Median Gross Rent and Log (Median Gross Rent).
2. Bivariate Screening of MSA-based Variables
A scatter plot with Log (Hotel Desk Clerk Wages) and Log (Private Union Membership))
was prepared to identify bivariate outliers. The relationship between the variables was linear and
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there were no extreme outliers based on visual inspection of the scatterplot (Figure C-18). A
scatter plot with Log (Hotel Desk Clerk Wages) and Log (Median Gross Rent) was also prepared
to identify bivariate outliers. The relationship between the variables was linear and no outliers
were identified with visual inspection. (Figure C-19).
3. Multivariate Screening
A preliminary regression analysis was conducted to identify multivariate outliers. No
cases exceeded a Mahalanobis value of 16.23, so no cases were removed from the final analysis.
4. Summary of Missing Data & Limitations
Union density data was the limiting factor among the three variables tested in this
hypothesis. There was union membership data for 260 of the 369 MSAs with wage data (from a
total population of 381 MSAs). The most missing data was from the less populated MSAs.
Seventy-six (76) percent of the bottom third of MSAs, by population, were missing data. To
reduce the non-randomness of the missing data, the thirty-three (33) cases with data in the
bottom third were removed, leaving 211 MSAs with Union Membership Data) for study in high
and middle population groups. These represent MSAs with a population over 160,000.
Data Preparation: H7
1. Data Acquisition and Univariate Screening
a. Dependent Variable: Housekeeping Wages
The 2010 wage data for hotel desk clerks (Classification 37-2012) was obtained from the
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) Survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). The data comes from BLS in an Excel spreadsheet and then was imported into SPSS.
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There are 359 Metropolitan Statistical Areas with data (out of 381) for Housekeeping
wages (94.2%). Z scores were prepared for all cases. There were 3 cases with Z scores above 3.3.
Finding no errors or extreme outliers in this group, all Metropolitan Statistical Areas were
analyzed for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: 1.55) and visual
inspection of a histogram revealed a small positive skewness to the data (Figure C-20). The Log
10 of the data was calculated to assess the potential improvement in the distribution of the data.
This transformation improved the distribution (Log 10 Skewness: 1.13), so the Log 10
transformation was used for further analysis (Table C-6, Figure C-21).
b. Independent Variable: Racial Disparity between Housekeeping Supervisors and
Housekeeping Employees
The racial composition of housekeeping supervisors (representing front-of-house
employees) and housekeepers (representing back-of-house employees) is available in the 2010
Equal Employment Opportunity Survey. The data for each classification was acquired by MSA
from the Census Bureau website (EEO_10_5YR_EEOALL1W_Data). The category selected to
define the racial composition of the two classifications was the number of employees designated
as “Not Hispanic or Latino, one race - White alone; Total, both sexes.” This data was imported
into SPSS, where values were computed for percent of white housekeeping supervisors and
percent of white housekeepers, and the gap between these two values. There were 354 MSAs
with gap data. No method was identified to replace missing data with estimates. Z scores were
prepared for all cases. There was 1 case with a Z score above 3.3. This single case was an
extreme outlier (4.92 SD) and removed from further analysis. The remaining 353 Metropolitan
Statistical Areas were analyzed for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: -
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.306) and visual inspection of a histogram revealed a near normal distribution (Figure C-22). No
transformation was performed.
c. Control Variable: Median Gross Rent
Median Gross Rents for all MSAs for 2010 from the American Community Survey
(Table ID B25064) were downloaded via the Census Bureau website. The data was downloaded
in an Excel spreadsheet, which in turn was imported into SPSS. There was no missing data.
Z scores were prepared for all 354 cases with data for the dependent variable (racial
disparity). There were 4 cases with Z scores above 3.3. There were no input errors or extreme
outliers in this group. Therefore, Median Gross Rent for all 354 cases were analyzed for
normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: 1.32) and visual inspection of a
histogram revealed a moderate positive skewness to the data (Figure C-23). The Log 10 of the
data was calculated to transform the data to a near-normal distribution (skewness: .762) (Table
C-7, Figure C-24).
2. Bivariate Screening
A scatter plot with Racial Disparity (X) and Log (Housekeeping Wages) (Y) was
prepared to identify bivariate outliers. There were seven extreme outliers based on visual
inspection of the scatterplot. These outliers were removed prior to the statistical analysis (Figure
C-25)
A scatter plot with Log (Housekeeping Wages) (Y) and Log (Median Gross Rent) was
prepared to identify bivariate outliers. There were no outliers based on visual inspection of the
scatterplot (Figure C-26).
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3. Multivariate Screening
A preliminary regression analysis was conducted to identify multivariate outliers. No
cases exceeded a Mahalanobis value of 16.23, so no cases were removed from the final analysis.
4. Summary of Missing Data & Limitations
There are 359 Metropolitan Statistical Areas with data (out of 381) for Housekeeping
wages (94.2%). There were 357 MSAs with gap data. No method was identified to replace
missing data with estimates.
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Chapter 4: Statistical Analysis and Findings
This study is focused on identifying potential forces associated with the wage problem in
the hospitality industry. The primary thesis, using Power to Tax theory as a theoretical
framework, is that local government officials are using the public economic benefits from
tourism to boost their own compensation and numbers. Several additional hypotheses are
presented which go beyond the primary thesis to explore dimensions of the wage problem in the
industry. Due to limitations in datasets, there are two types of cases for the hypotheses; Counties
are used in Hypotheses 1-5, and Metropolitan Statistical Areas are used in Hypotheses 6 and 7.
Statistical information is presented in text and tables as recommended by Nicol and Pexman for
linear regression (Nicol & Pexman, 2010) and Hayes for mediated linear regression (Hayes,
2018).
Overview of Findings
For the primary focus of this study, a significant relationship was found between hotel
revenue and local government wages. The effect of this relationship was large, based on
definitions set forth by Cohen (Warner, 2013, p. 208), with hotel revenue accounting for over
11% of the change in local government wages per capita (H1) after controlling for cost of living.
Other notable findings include a determination that natural amenities do not have a significant
effect on local government wages independent of its effect through hotel revenue (H4), and a
significant and large effect of union density (H6) on wages in the accommodation subsector for
MSAs with populations over 160,000. Finally, there was a significant and medium effect of the
racial disparity between supervisors and front-line housekeepers and the wages of front-line
housekeepers (H7). This last finding has limitations due to the alignment of the supervisor -
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employee classifications across the accommodation subsector. The findings provide support for
the Power to Tax theory (H1) and are consistent with Split labor market Theory (H7).

Table 12: Overview of Findings
Associations tested by Hypothesis

Relationship

Null Hypothesis
Rejected

Alternative Hypothesis
Accepted

H1. Hotel Revenue (X) and Local
Government Wages (Y)

Positive

Yes

Yes

H2. Natural Amenities (X) and Hotel
Revenue (Y)

Positive

Yes

Yes

H3. Natural Amenities (X) and Local
Government Wages (Y)

Positive

Yes

Yes

H4. Hotel Revenue (M) mediating
relationship between Natural Amenities
(X) and Local Government Wages (Y)
H5. Rurality, Hotel Revenue (X) and Local
Government Wages (Y)
H6. Union Density (X) and Hotel Wages
(Y)
H7. Race Disparity between Housekeeping
Supervisors and Employees (X) and
Wages of Housekeeping Employees (Y)

Positive

Yes

Yes

Positive

No

No

Positive

Yes

Yes

Negative

Yes

Yes (with Limitations)

Below are the statistical analyses and detailed findings for each hypothesis.
H1: Counties with higher levels of per capita hotel revenue will have higher levels of per
capita local government wages
For the final analysis, Log (Median Gross Rent) was entered as Step 1, explaining 1.5%
of the variance in Log (Local Government Wages per Capita). After entry of Log (Hotel
Revenue per Capita) at Step 2 the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 12.4%, F
(2, 2758) =194.57, p < .001. The predictor variable explained an additional 10.9% of the
variance in Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) after controlling for cost of living, R
squared change = .109, F change (1,2758) = 341.68, p < .001. In the final model, only the
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predictor variable [(Log10 (Hotel Revenue per Capita Log)] was statistically significant and no
issues with multicollinearity between variables were identified:

Log (Local Government Wages Per Capita) =
2.95 + .026 x Median Gross Rent + .097 x Log (Hotel Revenue Per Capita)

These findings permit rejection of the null hypothesis and validate the subject alternative
hypothesis (H1).
Table 13: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) predicting Log
(Local Government Wages per Capita) (N=2,761)

Step and
Variable

B

SE B

β

R2

ΔR2

.190

.029

.123***

.015***

--

.097

.005

.346***

.124***

.109***

Step 1:
Median Gross
Rent
Step 2:
Log (Hotel
Revenue per

Capita)
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

After converting the log transformation of the variables, it can be stated that for every ten
percent increase in hotel revenue per capita, local government wages per capita increases by
1.0%. This finding is consistent with Power to Tax theory which posits that public officials are
rational actors who will bend public policy (i.e., taxation, spending) towards their self-interests.
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H2: Counties with higher scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will have higher per
capita hotel revenue
Simple linear regression was used to assess the ability of natural amenities to predict Log
(hotel revenue per capita). The final regression model explains 7.8% of the variance (R2) and was
significant, F (1,2868) = 243.25, p <.001. It was found that natural amenities significantly, with a
medium to large effect, predicted hotel activity (β1= .265, p < .001). No issues with
multicollinearity between variables were identified in the final analysis.
The final model was:

Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) = 2.28 + .07 x Natural Amenities

These findings permit rejection of the null hypothesis and validate the subject alternative
hypothesis (H2).
After exponentiating the common log coefficient (.07), two counties that differ by one
unit on the Natural Amenities Scale are estimated to differ by 7.25% in Hotel Revenue per
Capita. The Natural Amenities Scale ranges from a low of -6.4 to a high of 11.17 for a range of
17.57. This validates previous research which found an association between natural amenities
and tourism development and serves as a foundation for Hypothesis #4 – which tests whether
hotel revenue per capita is a causal link between natural amenities and local government wages
per capita.
Practitioners in both the planning and public finance disciplines should consider how the
source of tourism tax revenues should reshape local economic development initiatives targeted at
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the low-wage tourism sector. Taxes derived from a common resource may deserve special
consideration in how they are used to further public policy goals. This is especially relevant
when the revenues, as the literature suggests, far exceed the cost of public service associated
with the activity which is taxed.
H3: Counties with higher scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will have higher
levels of per capita local government wages
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of Natural Amenities to
predict Log (Local government wages per capita), after controlling for the influence of cost of
living [Log (Median Gross Rent)].
The Log (Median Gross Rent) was entered as Step 1, explaining 0.9% of the variance in
Log (Local Government Wages per Capita). After entry of Natural Amenities at Step 2 the total
variance explained by the model as a whole was 1.1%, F (2, 2888) = 16.186, p < .001. The
predictor variable explained an additional .2% (small effect) of the variance in Log (Local
Government Wages per Capita) after controlling for cost of living, R squared change = .2, F
change (1, 2888) = 6.04, p = .014. In the final model the control variable [Log (Median Gross
Rent)] scored a higher beta value (beta = .08, p = .001)) than Log (Local Government Wages)
(beta = .048, p = .014). No issues with multicollinearity between variables were identified in the
preliminary analysis:
Log (Local Government Wages Per Capita) =
2.88 + .128 x Log (Median Gross Rent) + .004 x Natural Amenities
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These findings permit rejection of the null hypothesis and validate the subject alternative
hypothesis (H2).
Table 14: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Natural Amenities predicting Log (Local Government
Wages) (N = 2,828)
Step and Predictor
Variable
Step 1:

B

SE B

β

R2

ΔR2

.153

.030

.095***

.009***

--

.004

.001

.048*

.011*

.002*

Median Gross Rent
(Log)
Step 2:
Natural Amenities
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

After exponentiating the common log coefficient (.004), two counties that differ by one
unit on the Natural Amenities Scale are estimated to differ by 0.4% in Local Government Wages
per Capita. The Natural Amenities Scale ranges from a low of -6.4 to a high of 11.17 for a range
of 17.57 units. This finding corroborates previous research by public choice economists testing
Power to Tax theory. Those researchers paired Power to Tax theory with Charles Tiebout’s
proposition that residents controlled the level of taxation in their community by voting with their
feet. Brueckner and Neumark tested natural amenities as an inhibitor to Tiebout’s proposition,
while Diamond tested the homogeneity of housing prices as the inhibitor. These economists
tested the association between residents with limited mobility and higher local government
spending on public salaries (the dependent variable in the studies). In this respect, the findings in
this dissertation are confirmatory and do not contribute anything new to the literature.
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H4: County scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will not influence per capita local
government wages independent of its effect on hotel revenue per capita
A list-wise mediated linear regression was conducted to assess whether Log (Hotel
Revenue per Capita) mediated the relationship between Natural Amenities and Log (Local
Government Wages per Capita). The number of cases tested in the model with the list-wise
condition was 2,712. Since there are fewer cases tested in this combined model, the results
associated with the previous three hypotheses differ slightly.
From a simple mediation analysis conducted using an ordinary least squares path
analysis, the findings are that Natural Amenities indirectly influenced Log (Local Government
Wages per Capita) through its effect on Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita). As illustrated below in
Figure 6 and Table 18, the level of Natural Amenities in a county was associated with the
amount of Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) in that county (a: .055 ) and levels of Log (Hotel
Revenue per Capita) in a county were associated with the Log (Local Government Wages per
Capita) (b: .0978). A bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect of Natural Amenities
on Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) (ab = .0054) based on 5,000 bootstrap samples
was entirely above zero (.0043 to .0066).
There was no evidence that natural amenities influenced Log (Local Wages per Capita)
independent of its effect on Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) (c’: -.0020, p = .14).
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Figure 6: Simple Mediation Model Results for H4

Table 15 Results of Simple Mediation Model for H4 (N=2,712)
Consequent
M: Log (Hotel Revenue Per Capita)

Antecedent
X: Natural Amenities
M: Log (Hotel Rev
Per Cap)
C2 : Log (Median
Gross Rent)
Constant

Y: Log (Loc. Govt. Wages Per Capita)

a

B
.0554
––

SE
.0048
––

p
.0000
––

c’
b

B
-.0020
.0978

SE
.0014
.0054

p
.1413
.0000

f2

1.2203

.1083

.0000

g2

-.0034

.0309

.9121

im

-1.1802

.3065
.0001
R2 = .1224
F (2,2709) = 188.88, p = .0000

iy

3.0296

.0858
.0000
R2 = .1181
F (3, 2708) = 120.86, p = .0000

After converting the common log values4 of hotel revenue per capita and local
government wages per capita to their original values, the findings can be stated as follows:

4

See Appendix E for details on process used to convert log values.
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Path b: For every ten percent increase in hotel revenue per capita, local government
wages per capita increase by just under 1% (0.94%). This is a large effect (R2=.1181) and
statistically significant (p = <.001).
Path a: Two counties that differ by one unit on the Natural Amenities Scale are
estimated to differ by 5.7% in Hotel Revenue per Capita. The Natural Amenities Scale
range is 17.57 units (-6.4 to 11.17). This is a large effect (R2 .1224) and statistically
significant (p = < .001).
Path c: Two counties that differ by one unit on the Natural Amenities Scale are estimated
to differ by 0.34% in Local Government Wages per Capita. This direct path is statistically
significant (p = .0175). However, as part of the mediation model (path c’), the coefficient
is negative (-.002) and not statistically significant (p = .1413). This change indicates there
was no evidence that Natural Amenities influenced Local Wages per Capita independent
of its effect on Hotel Revenue per Capita).
Path ab (Hypothesis 4): Two counties that differ by one unit on the Natural Amenities
Scale will differ by 0.54% in Local Government Wages per Capita. This finding is
statistically significant as a bootstrap confidence interval for this indirect effect, based on
5,000 bootstrap samples, was entirely above zero (.0043 to .0066). Since this range of
coefficients do not include zero, the null hypothesis can be rejected, and the alternative
hypothesis is confirmed.
The finding for path ab, which indicate pathway from natural amenities to hotel revenue
per capita to local government wages per capita, validate previous research which found an
association between natural amenities and tourism development, but challenge previous research
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finding a direct association between natural amenities and local government wages per capita.
The findings for path ab suggest there is not a direct association between natural amenities and
local government wages per capita independent of the pathway through hotel revenue per capita.
This finding provides important foundational information for drawing conclusions relative to the
wage structure problem in the tourism industry. Since the findings indicates that tourism
monetizes natural amenities, and in turn, local governments use this value to boost their own
wage structure, it suggests that solving the wage structure problem in the tourism industry may
be rooted in how local planning and public finance practitioners view and treat the origins of
tourism taxes. Do they consider the tax revenue as a public economic benefit derived from local
natural amenities, is it a product of private enterprise, or does the origin of this revenue not
matter and the revenue simply gets lost as it is blended with other tax revenues during the
budgeting process?
H5: There will be a stronger positive relationship between per capita hotel revenue and per
capita local government wages in Mostly Rural and Rural counties as compared to Mostly
Urban counties
After removing the same multivariate outliers from Hypothesis 1, the data for
independent, dependent and control variables were split into three groups: Mostly Urban, Mostly
Rural, and Rural. This test is conducted to assess whether local governments in rural counties
extract more of their wages from hotel taxes than urbanized counties. The premise being that
rural counties can spend less on built amenities to attract visitors, and therefore can extract more
hotel tax revenue for wages. As with Hypothesis 1, hierarchical regression was used to assess the
ability of Log (Hotel Revenue Per Capita) to predict Log (Local Government Wages Per Capita)
– by counties designated rural, mostly rural and mostly urban. Table 16 provides a recap of the
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findings by urban-rural classification. The findings indicate the association between Log (Hotel
Revenue per Capita) and Log (local government wages per capita) does not change materially
across urban-rural classifications – with R2 change ranging from 8.5% to 11.4%.
Table 16: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) and Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) by Rural Classification

B

SE B

β

R2

ΔR2

Step 1: Log (Median Gross Rent)

.139

.031

.087***

.007***

--

Step 2: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita)

.095

.005

.321***

.114***

.106***

Step 1: Log (Median Gross Rent)

.202

.104

.088

.008

--

Step 2: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita)

.112

.014

.355***

.114***

.096***

Step 1: Log (Median Gross Rent)

.240

.061

.117***

.014***

--

Step 2: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita)

.082

008

.303***

.085***

.091***

Mostly Urban Counties (n=1168)

.133

.038

.102***

.010

--

.085

.008

.308***

.090***

.093***

Step and Variable

All Counties

Rural Counties (n=489)

Mostly Rural Counties (n=1105)

Step 1: Log (Median Gross Rent)
Step 2: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita)
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

H6: MSA’s with higher levels of union membership will have higher levels of
accommodation subsector wages
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of Log (Private Union
Membership) to predict Log (Hotel Desk Clerk Wages), after controlling for the influence of cost
of living [Log (Median Gross Rent)]. For the final analysis, The Log (Median Gross Rent) was
entered as Step 1, explaining of 54.7% of the variance in Log (Hotel Desk Clerk Wages). After
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entry of Log (Private Union Membership) at Step 2 the total variance explained by the model as
a whole was 62.9%, F (2, 203) = 171.86, p < .001. The predictor variable explained an additional
8.0% of the variance in Log (hotel desk clerk wages), after controlling for cost of living, R
squared change = .08, F change (1, 203) = 43.65, p < .001. In the final model, both the control
and predictor variables were statistically significant with the control variable [Log (Median
Gross Rent)] scoring a higher beta value (beta = .721, p = < .001)) than Log (Private Union
Membership Log) (beta = ..283, p = < .001);

Log (Hotel Desk Clerk Wages) =
-.335 + .451 x Log (Median Gross Rent) + .044 x Log (Private Union Membership)

Table 17: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Private Union Membership Predicting Hotel Desk Clerk
Wages
Step and Predictor Variable

B

SE B

β

R2

ΔR2

Step 1: Log (Median Gross Rent)

.464

.029

.741***

.549***

--

Step 2: Log (Private Union

.044

.007

.283***

.629***

.08***

Membership

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

After converting the common log, it can be stated that for every 25% percent increase in
private union membership, hotel clerk wages increase by 1%.
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H7: Counties with a higher differential in racial composition between housekeeping
supervisors and housekeeping employees will have lower housekeeping wages
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of the racial disparity
between supervisors and front-line employees to predict the employee wages, after controlling
for the influence of cost of living [(Log (Median Gross Rent)]. The Log (Median Gross Rent)
was entered as Step 1, explaining 23.2% of the variance in employee wages. After entry of the
racial disparity between employee groups at Step 2, the total variance explained by the model
increased to 26.6%, F (2, 346) = 66.46, p < .001. The predictor variable (racial disparity)
explained an additional 3.3% variance (medium effect) in employee wages, after controlling for
cost of living, R squared change = .033, F change (1, 347) = 15.78, <.001. In the final model,
both predictor variables were statistically significant with the Log (Median Gross Rent) variable
recording a higher beta value (.533, p<.001) than the Racial Disparity variable (-.187, p<.001).

Log (Housekeeping Wages) =
.291 + .24 x Log (Median Gross Rent) + .0 x Racial Disparity

Table 18: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Racial Disparity between Supervisors and Employees
predicting Minority Wages
B

SE B

β

R2

ΔR2

Step 1: (Log) Median Gross Rent

.338

.062

-.522***

.232***

--

Step 2: Racial Gap

.000

.000

-.187***

.266***

.033***

Step and Predictor Variable

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
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The results indicate that for one standard deviation change in the racial gap between
supervisors and workers, there is a negative one standard deviation change in wages. There are
significant limitations with these findings, as the data for occupations (housekeeping supervisors
and housekeepers) can only be separated by industry at the State level. Therefore, the county
data includes multiple industries which may have different dynamics than the hospitality
subsector.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
This dissertation explores a unique dimension to the wage problem in the tourism
industry by addressing the distribution of public economic benefits from the industry. The
analyses focus on the cornerstone of the industry - the hospitality subsector. The primary
findings indicate that local government employees are directing some tax revenue from hotel
activity to boost their own numbers and compensation. Furthermore, the findings, corroborated
in part by previous studies, indicate local government employees are commodifying the natural
amenities in their communities through hotel taxes. Taken together, the findings reveal a conduit
by which local government employees first commodify natural amenities through hotel taxes,
and then use this economic benefit to boost their payrolls by either increasing their numbers or
compensation.
The key findings and new contributions to the literature are illustrated in the figure
below, and can be stated as follows:
•

A ten percent in Hotel Revenue per Capita is associated with an increase of just under 1%
(0.94%) in Local Government Wages per Capita (H1),

•

For every unit increase in the USDA Natural Amenities Scale (mediated by the influence of
Hotel Revenue per Capita) there is an increase of 0.54% in Local Government Wages per
Capita.

•

There is no direct association between the USDA Natural Amenities Scale and Local
Government Wages per Capita, challenging previous research.
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Figure 7: New Contributions

Hotel revenue per capita is a proxy for tourism tax revenue - which previous research
indicates far exceeds the cost of providing services to the visitors who generate such taxes. The
findings indicate that there is a strong association between these tourism-related taxes and local
government wages. This finding indicates that at least some of the public economic benefits of
tourism are being distributed to local government payrolls - either though exceptional wages or
increased numbers of employees. This finding addresses a gap in the existing literature regarding
the distribution of public economic benefits from tourism and the primary research question:
How are the public economic benefits of the hospitality subsector distributed? Practitioners in
both planning and public finance disciplines should consider how this finding could reshape
local economic development initiatives targeted at the low-wage tourism sector.
The findings also indicate an indirect association between natural amenities and local
government wages when mediated by hotel revenue per capita. This validates previous research
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which found an association between natural amenities and tourism development (Marcouiller et
al., 2004), but challenges previous research finding a direct association between natural
amenities and local government wages per capita.
This finding of a path from Natural Amenities to Hotel Revenue per Capita to Local
Government Wages per Capita provides important foundational information for drawing
conclusions relative to the wage structure problem in the tourism industry. Since the findings
indicates that tourism monetizes natural amenities, and in turn, local governments use this value
to boost their own wage structure, it suggests that solving the wage structure problem in the
tourism industry may be rooted in how local planning and public finance practitioners apply the
origins of tourism taxes to subsequent distribution policies. Do they consider the tourism tax
revenue as a public economic benefit derived from local natural amenities, is it a product of
private enterprise, or is the origin irrelevant and the economic benefit simply blended with other
tax revenues during the budgeting process?
If tourism tax revenue is directly associated with the natural amenities of a community,
the potential exists, as with other unique revenues, that it could be tied to a specific public
purpose associated with its origins. There are many examples of planners and public financial
officials investing new incremental tax revenues in activities which are believed to generate
those new revenues (i.e., office buildings and housing in targeted redevelopment areas, retail
centers, and hotel development). In the hypothesis tested here, there are two ingredients that
come together to generate the new revenue – natural amenities and tourism development. To
date, the focus of practitioners and urban theorists Susan Fainstein and David Harvey has been
that public and private investment in tourism development is the only source of this new tax
revenue. This likely has shaped the reinvestment strategies of planners and public finance
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officials, and the solutions urban theorists have raised to address the wage structure problem in
the tourism industry (extracting a share of private economic benefits to balance the distribution
between labor and capital).
These findings suggest that solving the wage problem in the tourism industry not only
involves addressing the distribution of private economic benefits, as suggested by Susan
Fainstein and David Harvey (Fainstein, 2010; Harvey, 2012), but requires attention to the bias of
local policymakers in bending the distribution of public economic benefits for their own selfenrichment (H1), and recognition that natural amenities are an important element of tourism
development (H4). Public choice economists will not be surprised by the findings for Hypothesis
#1. They will see the behavior quantified in the analysis as no more than rational actors pursing
their own self-interests. For public administrators and planners charged with policymaking at the
local level, however, this finding reveals a potential blind spot that raises questions about the
techniques used to evaluate the benefits of tourism, transparency on the distribution of public
economic benefits and about the limits of planners to address the wage problem in the tourism
industry. The finding of a causal pathway between natural amenities and local government wages
through hotel revenue raises questions about the ability of Power to Tax theory to stand alone,
and the potential need to incorporate commons planning into local tourism policies.
Other findings are 1) the association between Hotel Revenue per Capita and Local
Government Wages per capita does not change materially between urban-rural population
categories, 2) increased private union membership in a county is associated with slight increases
in hotel clerk wages, and 3) there is a small negative relationship between the racial composition
of supervisors and workers and worker wages. The existing literature suggests that rural counties
can leverage natural amenities to develop a local tourism industry (Hassebrook, 2003). While
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this may be true, the findings indicate that local governments in rural counties are not exploiting
these natural amenities for financial gain any more so than their urban counterparts.
The other two findings, while suffering from some limitations in the underlying data, address
more direct ways in which wages are influenced in the tourism industry. The finding on union
membership and wages answers the research question, have unions improved the wage structure
in their local hospitality subsector (?), in the affirmative. There is a positive and statistically
significant association between higher union participation and higher wages. This finding
confirms prior research (Card, 2001; Mishel & Walters, 2003) and supports efforts that advocate
for development of unions as a means to address the wage structure problem in the tourism
industry.
The finding on racial disparities between supervisors and line workers and minority wages
answers the research question “do differences in race between front of house and back of house
employees in the hospitality subsector reduce the wages of back of house employees?” The
answer, subject to the limitations of the data, is yes, differences in race between supervisors and
frontline employees in the housekeeping occupation is associated with reduced wages for
frontline employees. There are significant limitations with these findings, as the data for
occupations (housekeeping supervisors and housekeepers) can only be separated by industry at
the State level. Therefore, the county data includes multiple industries which may have different
dynamics than the hospitality subsector.
Conclusions and Recommendations
To draw conclusions and make recommendations based on the findings of this
dissertation I use Fainstein’s Just City Model of planning and the past work of tourism scholars
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and public choice economists. Fainstein’s system parallels, in part, the work of H. George
Frederickson in the public administration literature. Frederickson challenged public
administrators to think beyond whether a program is effective or good, but to consider for whom
the program is effective and good (Frederickson, 1992). Fainstein’s Just City Model suggests a
multi-dimensional planning approach to replace the current process-oriented model used in most
urban settings. Fainstein adds the principles of equity and diversity to the existing emphasis
planners place on democracy, encourages a more active role by planners in managing markets,
empowers planners to become advocates for the disenfranchised, and emphasizes the strategic
importance of information in a just planning process.
The work of tourism scholars intersects with Fainstein’s recommended planning
approach in some respects. The use of community benefit assessments to replace economic
input-output models meets Fainstein’s objective of providing useful information to decision
makers on matters of equity and diversity. Another useful tool found among tourism
practitioners are the micro-simulation models which detail the distribution of private economic
benefits – a necessity if planners are to present options on how to direct these benefits for just
outcomes (See Interim Hospitality Consultants). These models can also be modified by planners,
with help from public finance colleagues, to assess the public economic benefits of individual
business activities and industry sectors. Finally, there are several measures of equity and
diversity being constructed and evaluated by scholars for developing countries which can be
employed by planners in the United States (See Table 5).
The work of public choice economists also intersects with Fainstein’s proposed planning
approach. Public choice economists position government employees as rational actors. Their
research, while often suggesting a lessor role for States with markets, can be incorporated by
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public officials to present a complete range of options to policymakers. Specifically, public
officials should assess and present historical policy decisions through the lens of public choice
theories. This includes measuring the effect of any rational acting which may have resulted in
self-enrichment by public employees. Finally, the work of sociologists and heterodox economists
on wage issues is another area of research which connects with Fainstein’s planning approach.
The work of these researchers raises issues for planners with respect to wage standards,
enforcement, and the distribution of private economic benefits. For example, Edna Bonacich’s
work, tested in this study, identifies the potential for unchecked systematic racism to suppress
wages among workers of color.
The findings of this dissertation suggest new areas for planners to consider when
planning the distribution of economic benefits from tourism development. Below are four
specific recommendations based on the existing literature and the findings of this study.
1. Focus on the distribution of public economic benefits
In addressing the wage problem in the tourism industry, Fainstein and Harvey focus their
attention on the redistribution of private economic benefits. For several reasons, the distribution
of public economic benefits is potentially a more fruitful starting place. First, visitors, either for
business or pleasure, are unlikely to alter destinations based on hotel taxes. Raising taxes on
these temporary residents is likely to be a continuing source of new revenue for local
governments. Second, microsimulation models reveal that tax revenue received by local
governments from hotel operations are roughly equal to the private economic benefits received
by private capital (Interim Hospitality Consultants, 2013). Third, these public economic benefits
are in large part associated with the natural amenities in a community (a form of commons) and
the commodification of the hospitality of employees. Since public economic benefits from
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hotels can be expanded (with higher taxes on visitors), are roughly equal to the private economic
benefits accruing to private capital, are generated in part by the commons and the hospitality of
residents, and controlled by local government employees and elected officials, there is the
opportunity for adopting policies which direct some of these public economic benefits to address
the wage structure problem in the industry.
2. Consider the past and present influence of rational actors
One of the focusses of public choice economics is the rational behavior of politicians and
public employees - while public administration and planning scholars generally presume that
public servants suppress self-interests. This study reveals that public economic benefits from
tourism are partly directed to self-enrichment of local government employees – including the
planners and public administrators charged with crafting policy options which could address the
wage structure problem in the tourism industry. This finding, combined with previous findings in
research conducted by public choice economists Brueckner, Neumark and Diamond (Brueckner
& Neumark, 2014; Diamond, 2017) suggests the need for reflexivity among public officials
involved in the distribution of public economic benefits.
Specifically, public officials should consider reviewing past allocations of public
economic benefits and consider process changes to make the distribution decisions more
transparent. Working together with public finance colleagues, planners should identify the full
distribution of public economic benefits (investment in tourist attractions, offsets to resident
taxes, subsidies to tourism developers, and any boost to public payrolls). A full accounting of
past distributions, compared against the historic wages of tourism employees, will allow elected
officials, unions, businesses, and employees to critique past outcomes (intended or unintended)
and develop a fuller range of recommendations on future distributions.
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To this end, local government officials should develop Community Benefit Assessment
(CBA) models to measure the distribution of past and project future public economic benefits.
The CBA approach can tie the economic activity of tourism directly to the benefits received by
public entities and employees in the industry. Conversely, the use of economic input-output
models should be limited to comparing public investments options among several projects or
industries, and not be used for standalone justifications for investments in individual projects.
3. Promote Integrated Planning
The methods and findings of this dissertation suggest that planners alone cannot address
the distribution of public economic benefits from tourism. Analyzing the public investment and
distribution of associated economic benefits and determining options to alter past practices and
policies requires an interdisciplinary team within local government. The team should be
comprised of employees with backgrounds in planning, public finance, demographics, and local
economic development. Public finance officials can identify the direct and indirect financial
assistance to the industry, as well as the distribution of public economic benefits. Planners and
local economic development officials can identify and quantify the value of regulatory incentives
granted for new development. Demographers can analyze wage and demographic data to
determine the nature of the wage problem in the tourism industry for a specific community and
distribution across groups.
An interdisciplinary team would have breadth of knowledge and experience with public
interventions which could be adapted or modified to address the wage structure problem in
tourism. For example, public finance and economic development officials could assess the
potential for new taxes (achieved either by higher tax rates or industry growth) to be used to
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mitigate wage problems. These officials have experience using tax growth to achieve public
objectives.
Pledging future increases in taxes, commonly referred to as tax increment financing
(TIF), is a common practice to meet the objectives of a community. TIF funds from property and
sales taxes are often used for private development or public projects (i.e., community centers,
cultural amenities) as a catalyst for increasing tourism. Adding wage equity to the list of uses of
TIF funds and adding transient occupancy taxes to the sources of TIF funds are both logical
extensions of existing practices by local governments. And for hotel developments which do not
request development assistance and are not required by local ordinances to provide living wages
to workers, rebating a portion of the local government’s windfall in new hotel taxes to achieve
higher wages, is also an extension of existing practices. Local governments routinely provide
financial assistance to project developers who do not request assistance to achieve public
objectives (i.e., community spaces, public art, architectural and design elements, etc.).
Beyond employing a team approach to address specific projects and social equity
concerns, planners, public finance officials and public administrators in general, should consider
joining the planning processes conducted by planners, and those conducted by public finance
officers. The split planning process employed today, where planners prepare general and
community specific plans, and public finance officers prepare operating and capital expenditure
plans, allows critical issues to be addressed with only part of the local government’s resources
and expertise. Combining these two planning processes would create better information for
policymakers and community members and expand the benefits of interdisciplinary teams from a
project basis to all priorities and policies of the jurisdiction.
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4. New strategic considerations and measures for Fainstein’s Just City Model
Fainstein’s recommended planning model for a Just City includes 1) recognition of the
State’s role in public investment and regulation, 2) recognition of the strategic importance of
information to achieve just ends, and 3) adding equity and diversity (to democracy) to the
principles which should guide planners Based on the findings in this study, I recommend that
integrated planning and reflexivity (as discussed above) be added to Fainstein’s strategic
considerations and that measures relating to equity (i.e., local wages) extend the scope of the
model. These measures would 1) establish a community baseline on matters of equity and
diversity and 2) permit specific goal setting in the planning process. The wage measures
suggested are the living wage metric discussed in Chapter 2 and the identifying any split labor
markets as posed by Edna Bonacich (Bonacich, 1972). These new elements are indicated in
italics in Figure 8 below.
Figure 8: Fainstein's Just City Planning Model & Recommended Additions (italics/bold)
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State’s Role in Planning
•Public Investment
•Regulation

Measures

Strategic Considerations

•Living Wages
•Equal Wages

•Information is power
•Integrated planning
•Recognize biases

Planning Principles
•Democracy
•Diversity
•Equity

Future Research
1. Other tourism subsectors
Future research on the lines of this dissertation can explore other segments of the tourism
industry which benefit from public investment or generate significant tax revenues for State and
local governments. Airports and rental car companies would be appropriate to study given the
near exclusivity of these businesses in supporting tourism. Restaurants and retail are also worthy
of study, but these industries would likely be difficult to connect with public tourism investment
since they are highly dependent on the patronage of area residents. Studies of those subsectors
which rely on the income and spending power of area residents and can involve interjurisdictional competition for sales taxes and would need to consider public investment and
regulatory relief beyond tourism-related activities.
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2. Evaluate Split Labor Markets within and across multiple industries
The split labor market component of this dissertation is worthy of additional study. The
alignment of supervisor-employee classifications within the hospitality subsector was not ideal,
but there could be better matches within other industry sectors, or across multiple industries.
This would require extensive research to identify highly matched classifications, but the analysis
which followed would permit stronger conclusions from the statistical analyses. In addition, a
baseline study of the association of the racial composition of the target employment
classification and wages would be an interesting and important addition to the hierarchal
regression analysis. This approach would reveal the contribution the racial composition of the
workforce makes to wage rates - before the racial disparity between supervisor and employee is
considered.
This is an important area of study for planners since there are few, if any, remedies for
the residents in their communities to address this problem. The path for employees to recover
wages lost to systematic racism is generally through the court system which requires substantial
time and financial resources. Addressing split labor markets in the planning process, with the
support of demographers and public finance specialists, is consistent with Fainstein’s
recommendations for a justice-oriented planning approach.
3. Review impact of wage ordinances on tourism economics
Another perspective on the wage problem in the tourism industry could be gained by
considering how local living wage ordinances in tourist destinations impact employment and
business revenue. Using a regression discontinuity design, the impact of wage ordinances could
be assessed by analyzing wage and revenue data prior to and after the effective date of the wage
ordinances. The City of Seattle is one example of a tourist destination which recently adopted
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such an ordinance. This type of study could identify how the redistribution of economic benefits
impacts residents (through increased wages), the local service economy (more spending by
residents due to higher wages) and tourism-based businesses (response to increased expenses).
4. Covid 19 and tourism resiliency
The impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on tourism presents another potential dimension to
explore. The crippling effect of the pandemic on tourism will result in many tourism-dependent
businesses seeking bankruptcy protections or public subsidies to remain viable until the
pandemic is under control. The significant amount of regulatory relief and direct public
investment in these businesses will allow local government to potentially reset wage expectations
for the industry, which in turn could be absorbed in the post-pandemic valuation of the real estate
and fixed assets associated with tourism businesses (i.e., hotels, airplanes, rental cars). Public
policies in the form of bankruptcy laws have permitted businesses to reset asset values in the past
based on changes in economic conditions, so it would not be unprecedented for a new wage
structure to be adopted as a condition of business accessing this public benefit. Assessing the use
of bankruptcy protections by tourism-related business and the distribution of public and private
economic benefits during the recovery of the industry, would be instructive in assessing the
capacity of counter-cyclical policy interventions. This link between asset valuations and wage
rates would be a valuable contribution to the emerging field of Domicology: the study of real
estate, social equity, and sustainability.
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Appendix A: Living Wage Data from Prospective Business Class Hotel Model
The table below presents employee wages in the Montevallo model with a column
indicating whether or not the wage meets or exceed the estimated living wage for the area. I use
the MIT wage calculator to estimate the living wage in Shelby County Alabama (Glasmeier,
2016) where the City of Montevallo is located. The living wage for a single person in Shelby
County is estimated to be $10.98 per hour. Of the 34 positions budgeted for this hotel project,
seven positions are scheduled to make more than the estimated living wage (Interim Hospitality
Consultants, 2013).
Table A- 1: Wage Schedule for Business Class Hotel Model

Salary

Pay rate at or
above Living
Wage
($10.98/Hour)

General Manager

1

$50,000

Yes

Secretary/Accounting

1

$40,000

Yes

$27,000

Yes

$40,000

Yes

Position

FullTime

Sales and Marketing
Chief Engineer

Part-time

Hourly Rate

1
1

Repair/Maintenance

1

$8.50

No

Host (Front Desk)

5

3

$9.00

No

Night Auditor

1

1

$11.00

Yes

Hostess (Breakfast)

2

$8.50

No

Hostess (Social Hour)

1

$8.50

No

Executive Housekeeper

1

----

$40,000

Inspectress Staff

1

$8.50

No

Houseman Staff

1

1

$8.50

No

Laundry

1

1

$8.50

No

Housekeepers

6

4

$8.50

No

Total

19

15

Source data: Interim Hospitality Consultants 2011 and MIT Living Wage Calculator
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Appendix B: Data Cleaning Steps
Univariate screening
Input errors: All data sets were created by large professional data collection organizations, so it
was presumed that data was inputted correctly, or that any errors were corrected since the
original publication of the data. Also, in the unlikely event that input errors remained
uncorrected, it was assumed that those errors would be identified with other screening techniques
applied to the data.
Missing data: If more than 10% of data was missing, processes to estimate data were explored.
After an estimation process was determined and executed, the randomness of the remaining
missing data was tested to assess any potential for bias. If the missing data was non-random,
options to trim the data set were explored. After all steps were taken any non-randomness
remaining was noted as a limitation (potential bias).
Univariate Outliers: Z scores were created for each case. Any values above or below 3.3 SD
from the mean, based on the recommended approach established by Tabachnick (2013, p 73),
were reviewed for possible input errors and extreme outliers. If the data was accurate, there were
just a few extreme outliers, all data was evaluated in the bivariate screening. This way, for
example, a county with extremely high housing costs was not eliminated, unless there were not
similarly high values for wages in that county.
Bivariate Screening
Linearity: X-Y Scatter Plots were prepared to identify outliers and check for linear distribution.
Extreme outliers were removed if there were more than a small percentage (per Tabachnick,
2013). Statistical analyses were conducted with and without these outliers. In all cases the
outliers increased the strength of the association being tested. To be conservative, the outliers
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were removed. Transformation was considered if relationships were not linear, however, no data
was transformed due to non-linearity.
Distribution of data (Normality): Histograms with overlays of normal distribution curves lines
were created to evaluate the shape of distribution. Transformation was then considered following
guidelines of Tabachnick (2013, p. 87-89). Linear regression is sensitive to distribution of data.
Highly positively or negatively skewed data was transformed by calculating the square root or
common log of the data. The distribution of this transformed data was then assessed to select the
best version to use in the statistical analysis. A common log (10) transformation was conducted
with several variables (Local government wages, hotel revenue, and median gross rent).
Multivariate Screening
Multivariate Outliers: A preliminary regression analysis was conducted for each hypothesis and
Mahalanobis Distance calculations were saved. The Mahalanobis outlier threshold, based on a
chi Square table using .001 as the cutoff were: 2 degrees of freedom (df) = 13.82, 3 df = 16.27,
and 4 df = 18.47. Discretion was exercised removing these outliers based on the number and
nature of the cases identified. Several cases were removed as multivariate outliers based on this
test.
Distribution (heteroscedasticity): A second preliminary regression analysis was conducted if
multivariate outliers were removed. A scatter plot was prepared for the residuals to confirm that
cases were centered around zero in a circular distribution. Extreme outliers were removed based
on visual inspection, and if the distribution was not centered symmetrically around zero,
transformation of variables was revisited. No cases were removed as a result of this test and no
transformations were conducted.
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Multicollinearity of Variables: Partial correlations were conducted and reviewed during the final
regression analysis to ensure there was no significant correlations between variables. No issues
were found with this test.
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Appendix C: Graphs and Tables used in Data Cleaning
Local Government Wages per Capita

Figure C- 1: Distribution of Data prior to Transformation

Table C- 1: Transformation Options for Local Government Wages Per Capita Data

Statistics
WagCap14
N

Valid
Missing

Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis

WagCap14SQR

WagCap14L10

2954

2954

2954

191

191

191

4.051

1.910

.808

.045

.045

.045

33.660

7.808

1.670

.090

.090

.090

Key: WagCap14: Local Government Wages per Capita; WagCap14SQR: SQRT (Local Government Wages per
Capita); WagCap14L10: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita).
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Figure C- 2: Distribution of Data for Local Government Wages after Transformation

Key: WagCap14L10: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita)

Hotel Revenue Per Capita
Table C- 2: Correlation among Hotel Data

Key: RCPTOT: Annual Hotel Revenue, PAYANN: Annual Hotel Payroll, Emp: Number of Hotel Employees,
ESTAB: Number of Hotel Establishments
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Figure C- 3: Distribution of Hotel Revenue Per Capita Data

Key: RevCap12: Hotel Revenue per Capita
Table C- 3: Hotel Revenue Per Capita Data after Transformation

Statistics
RevCap12
N

Valid
Missing

Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis

RevCap12SQR

RevCap12L10

2926

2926

2926

219

219

219

23.400

4.476

.349

.045

.045

.045

811.758

41.462

.551

.090

.090

.090

Key: RevCap12: Hotel Revenue per Capita; RevCap12SQR: SQRT (Hotel Revenue per Capita; RevCap12L10: Log
(Hotel Revenue per Capita).
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Figure C- 4: Common Log of Hotel Revenue Per Capita

Key: ReveCap12L10: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita)

Natural Amenities
Figure C- 5: Distribution of Natural Amenities Scale

Key: NASscale: Natural Amenities Scale
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Median Gross Rent (H1-H5)
Figure C- 6: Distribution of Median Gross Rent

Key: MGRent: Median Gross Rent

Table C- 4: Transformation of Median Gross Rent

Key: MGRent: Median Gross Rent; RentSQRT: SQRT (Median Gross Rent; RentLog10: Log (Median Gross Rent)
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Figure C- 7: Transformation of Median Gross Rent

Key: RentLog10: Log (Median Gross Rent)
Bivariate Screening (H1-H5)
Figure C- 8: Bivariate Screening of Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) and Log (Hotel Revenue Per Capita)

Key: RevCap12L10: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita)
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Figure C- 9: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) and Natural Amenities

Outliers: : 21: New York County, New York; 748: Alpine County, California; 1844: Love County, Oklahoma; 2269: Swain
County, North Carolina, 2879: Menominee County, Wisconsin.
Key: WagCap14L10: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita); NASscale: Natural Amenities Scale.

Figure C- 10: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) and Natural Amenities

Outliers: 1314: Tazewell County, Illinois
Key: RevCap12L10: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita); NASscale: Natural Amenities Scale.
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Figure C- 11: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) and Log (Median Gross Rent)

Outliers: 2269: Swain County, North Carolina; 2879: Menominee County, Wisconsin; 129: North Slope Borough, Alaska; 21:
New York County, New York; 15: Honolulu County, Hawaii; 50: District of Columbia, District of Columbia; 161: Bronx
County, New York; 87 Kings County, New York; 36: Queens County, New York; 93: Richmond County, New York.
Key: WagCap12L10: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita); RentLog10: Log (Median Gross Rent).

Table C- 5: Outliers Removed
Outliers Removed Based on Bivariate Analysis
1.

Alpine County, California

2.

Bronx County, New York

3.

District of Columbia, District of Columbia

4.

Honolulu County, Hawaii

5.

Kings County, New York

6.

Love County Oklahoma

7.

Menominee County, Wisconsin

8.

New York County, New York

9.

North Slope Borough, Alaska

10.

Queens County, New York

11.

Richmond County, New York

12. Swain County, North Carolina
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Hotel Clerk Wages (H6)
Figure C- 12: Hotel Clerk Mean Hourly Wage

Key: H_Mean: Hotel Clerk Hourly Mean Wage

Figure C- 13: Log (Mean Hourly Hotel Clerk Wages)

Key: H_MEAN_L10: Log (Mean Hourly Hotel Clerk Wages)
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Union Membership (H6)
Figure C- 14: Private Union Membership Percentage

Key: PvMemPct: Percentage of Private Union Membership

Figure C- 15: Log (Private Union Membership Percentage)

Key: PvMemPctL10: Log (Percentage of Private Union Membership)
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Median Gross Rent (H6)
Figure C- 16: Median Gross Rent

Key: RentMSA: Median Gross Rent
Figure C- 17: Log (Median Gross Rent)

Key: L10Rent: Log (Median Gross Rent)
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Bivariate Screening (H6)
Figure C- 18: Log (Mean Hotel Clerk Hourly Wage) & Log (Private Union Membership Percentage)

Key: H_Mean_L10: Log (Hotel Clerk Hourly Mean Wage); PvMemPctL10: Log (Percentage of Private Union Membership)

Figure C- 19: Log (Mean Hotel Clerk Hourly Wages) & Log (Median Gross Rent)

Key: H_Mean_L10: Log (Hotel Clerk Hourly Mean Wage); L10Rent: Log (Median Gross Rent).
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Housekeeping Wages (H7)
Figure C- 20: Mean Housekeeping Hourly Wages

Key: H_MEAN_HK: Housekeeping Hourly Mean Wage

Table C- 6: Transformation of Mean Housekeeping Wages

Statistics
H_MEAN_HK
N

Valid

WageLog10

359

359

0

0

Mean

9.5192

.9764

Median

9.3100

.9689

1.00433

.04312

Variance

1.009

.002

Skewness

1.555

1.129

.129

.129

3.742

1.903

Std. Error of Kurtosis

.257

.257

Range

6.33

.25

Minimum

8.00

.90

Maximum

14.33

1.16

Missing

Std. Deviation

Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis

Key: H_MEAN_HK: Housekeeping Hourly Mean Wage; WageLog10: Log (Housekeeping Hourly Mean Wage).
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Figure C- 21: Log (Mean Housekeeping Hourly Wages)

Key: WageLog10: Log (Housekeeping Hourly Mean Wage).

Supervisor-Employee Racial Composition Gap (H7)
Figure C- 22: Racial Gap between Housekeeping Supervisors and Housekeepers

Key: RaceGap: Difference in racial composition of housekeeping supervisors and housekeepers.
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Median Gross Rent (H7)
Figure C- 23: Median Gross Rent 2010

Key: Estimate!!Median gross rent: Median Gross Rent
Table C- 7: Median Gross Rent and Log (Median Gross Rent)

Median gross rent
N

Valid

MedRentLog10

359

359

0

0

Mean

759.58

2.8717

Median

716.00

2.8549

162.496

.08557

26404.858

.007

1.320

.762

.129

.129

1.928

.349

Std. Error of Kurtosis

.257

.257

Range

913

.46

Minimum

484

2.68

Maximum

1397

3.15

Missing

Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis

Key: MedRentLog10: Log (Median Gross Rent)
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Figure C- 24: Log (Median Gross Rent)

Key: MedRentLog10: Log (Median Gross Rent)

Bivariate Screening (H7)
Figure C- 25: Log (Housekeeping Wages) and Race Gap

Outliers: 357: New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA Metro Area, 358: Honolulu, HI Metro
Area, 359: Kingston, NY Metro Area, 3: San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA Metro Area, 9: Bridgeport-StamfordNorwalk, CT Metro Area, 13: Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH Metro Area,21: Las Vegas-Paradise, NV Metro
Area.
Key: WageLog10: Log (Housekeeping wages), RaceGap: Difference in supervisor-employee racial composition
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Figure C- 26: Log (Mean Hourly Housekeeping Wage) and Log (Median Gross Rent)

Key: WageLog10: Log (Mean Hourly Housekeeping Wage); MedRentLog10: Log (Median Gross Rent)
Figure C- 27: Residual Plot for Hypothesis 7

Key: WageLog10: Log (Mean Hourly Housekeeping Wage)
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Appendix D: PROCESS Output for Mediation Model
Run MATRIX procedure:
***************** PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Version 3.5 *****************
Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D.
www.afhayes.com
Documentation available in Hayes (2018). www.guilford.com/p/hayes3
**************************************************************************
Model : 4
Y : WagCap_1 = Log (Local Government Wages per Capita)
X : NASscale = USDA Natural Amenities Scale
M : RevCap_1 = Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita)
Covariates:
RentLog1
Sample
Size: 2712
**************************************************************************
OUTCOME VARIABLE:
RevCap_1 = Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita)
Model Summary
R
.3498

R-sq
.1224

MSE
.2751

F
188.8792

df1
2.0000

df2
2709.0000

p
.0000

Model
constant
NASscale
RentLog1

coeff
-1.1802
.0554
1.2203

a

se
.3065
.0048
.1083

t
-3.8510
11.4905
11.2637

p
.0001
.0000
.0000

LLCI
-1.7811
.0459
1.0078

ULCI
-.5793
.0649
1.4327

Standardized coefficients
coeff
NASscale
.2179
RentLog1
.2136
Covariance matrix of regression parameter estimates:
constant
NASscale
RentLog1
constant
.0939
.0005
-.0332
NASscale
.0005
.0000
-.0002
RentLog1
-.0332
-.0002
.0117
**************************************************************************
OUTCOME VARIABLE:
WagCap_1 = Log (Local Government Wages per Capita)
Model Summary
R
.3436

R-sq
.1181

MSE
.0214

F
120.8556

df1
3.0000

df2
2708.0000

p
.0000

Model
coeff

se

t
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p

LLCI

ULCI

The Just Host
constant
NASscale
RevCap_1
RentLog1

3.0296
-.0020 c’
.0978 b
-.0034

.0858
.0014
.0054
.0309

35.3287
-1.4714
18.2339
-.1104

.0000
.1413
.0000
.9121

2.8615
-.0047
.0872
-.0641

3.1978
.0007
.1083
.0572

Standardized coefficients
coeff
NASscale
-.0286
RevCap_1
.3513
RentLog1
-.0021
Covariance matrix of regression parameter estimates:
constant
NASscale
RevCap_1
RentLog1
constant
.0074
.0000
.0000
-.0026
NASscale
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
RevCap_1
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
RentLog1
-.0026
.0000
.0000
.0010
Test(s) of X by M interaction:
F
df1
df2
12.4989
1.0000 2707.0000

p
.0004

************************** TOTAL EFFECT MODEL ****************************
OUTCOME VARIABLE:
WagCap_1
Model Summary
R
.0990

R-sq
.0098

MSE
.0240

F
13.4049

df1
2.0000

df2
2709.0000

p
.0000

Model
constant
NASscale
RentLog1

coeff
2.9142
.0034
.1159

c

se
.0906
.0014
.0320

t
32.1651
2.3774
3.6181

p
.0000
.0175
.0003

LLCI
2.7366
.0006
.0531

ULCI
3.0919
.0062
.1787

Standardized coefficients
coeff
NASscale
.0479
RentLog1
.0729
Covariance matrix of regression parameter estimates:
constant
NASscale
RentLog1
constant
.0082
.0000
-.0029
NASscale
.0000
.0000
.0000
RentLog1
-.0029
.0000
.0010
****************** CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MODEL RESIDUALS ******************
RevCap_1
WagCap_1

RevCap_1
1.0000
.0000

WagCap_1
.0000
1.0000

************** TOTAL, DIRECT, AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y **************
Total effect of X on Y
Effect

se

t

p

LLCI
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ULCI

c_ps

c_cs
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.0034 c

.0014

2.3774

.0175

.0006

.0062

.0218

.0479

p
.1413

LLCI
-.0047

ULCI
.0007

c'_ps
-.0130

c'_cs
-.0286

Direct effect of X on Y
Effect
-.0020

c’

se
.0014

t
-1.4714

Indirect effect(s) of X on Y:
Effect
BootSE
BootLLCI
BootULCI
RevCap_1
.0054 ab
.0006
.0043
.0066
Partially standardized indirect effect(s) of X on Y:
Effect
BootSE
BootLLCI
BootULCI
RevCap_1
.0348
.0036
.0278
.0420
Completely standardized indirect effect(s) of X on Y:
Effect
BootSE
BootLLCI
BootULCI
RevCap_1
.0765
.0081
.0610
.0928
*********************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS ************************
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:
95.0000
Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:
5000
WARNING: Variables names longer than eight characters can produce incorrect
output
when some variables in the data file have the same first eight characters.
Shorter
variable names are recommended. By using this output, you are accepting all
risk
and consequences of interpreting or reporting results that may be incorrect.
------ END MATRIX -----
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Appendix E: Transformation of Results
The output of the linear regression models which included log transformed data was transformed
for easier interpretation in an Excel worksheet. The calculations are outlined on the University of
Virginia library website. For details and examples see:
https://data.library.virginia.edu/interpreting-log-transformations-in-a-linear-model/
In summary:
When only the dependent/response variable is log-transformed:

(Exp (Coefficient)-1) * 100 = Transformed Coefficient

With this value, the results can be stated as, for a one unit increase in the independent variable,
the dependent variable increases/decreases by (transformed coefficient)
When only the independent/predictor variable(s) is log-transformed:

Coefficient/100 = Transformed Coefficient
With this value, a 1% increase in the independent variable increases (or decreases) the dependent
variable by the transformed coefficient.
Both dependent/response variable and independent/predictor variable(s) are logtransformed:
Interpret the coefficient as the percent increase in the dependent variable for every 1% increase
in the independent variable.
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